Tribalism and Democracy by Davis, Seth
William & Mary Law Review 
Volume 62 (2020-2021) 
Issue 2 Article 3 
11-2020 
Tribalism and Democracy 
Seth Davis 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr 
 Part of the American Politics Commons, Indian and Aboriginal Law Commons, and the Law and Race 
Commons 
Repository Citation 
Seth Davis, Tribalism and Democracy, 62 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 431 (2020), 
https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr/vol62/iss2/3 






Americans have long talked about “tribalism” as a way of talking
about their democracy. In recent years, for example, commentators
have pointed to “political tribalism” as what ails American democ-
racy. According to this commentary, tribalism is incompatible with
democracy. Some commentators have cited Indian Tribes as evidence
to support this incompatibility thesis, and the thesis has surfaced
within federal Indian law and policy in various guises up to the
present day with disastrous consequences for Indian Tribes. Yet
much of the talk about tribalism and democracy—within federal
Indian law, and also without it—has had little to do with actual
tribes. Looking at the histories and practices of Indian Tribes calls
the premises of the incompatibility thesis into question. Indeed, many
examples of Indian Tribalism reflect the democratic practices that
critics of “political tribalism” praise. First, Indian Tribal self-
government safeguards democracy by ensuring that Indians not only
are governed (by the federal and state governments), but also have
the opportunity to govern. Second, Indian Tribal governance is
compatible with democracy because it depends in no small measure
upon discourse and negotiation, not upon coercion and zero-sum
gaming. And third, the persistence of Indian Tribes in the face of the
coercion and violence of colonialism challenges Americans to honor
the democratic ideal of consent of the governed. In all three ways,
Indian Tribalism and American democracy are compatible.
* Professor of Law, University of California, Berkeley School of Law. Email:
sethdavis@berkeley.edu. I would like to thank the participants at workshops at the University
of California, Berkeley School of Law and the University of California, Irvine School of Law,
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INTRODUCTION
There is a specter haunting American democracy—the “retreat to
tribalism.”1 “Tribalism,” it seems, is to blame for authoritarianism,2
and for moral absolutism,3 and even for the questioning of truth
itself.4 To describe “American politics today requires a word as
primal as ‘tribe’ to get at the blind allegiances and huge passions of
partisan affiliation.”5 Destructive “tribalism,” commentators warn,
is hardwired within the human brain.6 Tribes are “badges of
identity, not of thought.”7 Tribes play “zero-sum politics.”8 They
1. David Brooks, The Retreat to Tribalism, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 1, 2018), https://www.
nytimes.com/2018/01/01/opinion/the-retreat-to-tribalism.html [https://perma.cc/4MYH-DLQZ].
2. Amy Chua, The Destructive Dynamics of Political Tribalism, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 20,
2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/20/opinion/destructive-political-tribalism.html [https:
//perma.cc/MDM5-843V]; see AMY CHUA, POLITICAL TRIBES: GROUP INSTINCT AND THE FATE OF
NATIONS 12-13 (2018).
3. SE Cupp, Tribalism Isn’t the Real Reason America Is Divided, CNN: OPINION (Nov.
13, 2019, 8:16 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2019/11/13/opinions/political-tribalism-not-reason-
america-divided-cupp/index.html [https://perma.cc/NC6B-9S95] (“Tribalism, of course, is a
compelling argument, considering that we’ve reduced our political beliefs to untenable
absolutisms, have sacrificed compromise and comity for purity and are subjecting each other
to increasingly unproductive tests of loyalty.”).
4. See Tom Wheeler, Technology, Tribalism, and Truth, BROOKINGS (Feb. 7, 2020), https:
//www.brookings.edu/blog/techtank/2020/02/07/technology-tribalism-and-truth/ [https://perma.
cc/TY6A-BHVW]; see also Paul Krugman, Economic Tribalism, N.Y. TIMES (May 5, 2012,
10:39 AM), https://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/05/05/economic-tribalism/ [https://perma.
cc/8XKQ-79Q4]; Paul Krugman, Tribalism, Biology, and Macroeconomics, N.Y. TIMES (Jan.
2, 2014, 8:37 AM), https://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/01/02/tribalism-biology-and-macro
economics [https://perma.cc/P3NY-S8Z5].
5. George Packer, A New Report Offers Insights into Tribalism in the Age of Trump, NEW
YORKER (Oct. 13, 2018), https://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/a-new-report-offers-
insights-into-tribalism-in-the-age-of-trump [https://perma.cc/AW6U-VJE3].
6. See JONAH GOLDBERG, SUICIDE OF THE WEST: HOW THE REBIRTH OF TRIBALISM,
POPULISM, NATIONALISM, AND IDENTITY POLITICS IS DESTROYING AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 10
(2018) (“[O]ur natural condition isn’t merely poor, it’s tribal.”); see also Andrew Sullivan,
America Needs a Miracle, N.Y. MAG.: INTELLIGENCER (Jan. 31, 2020), https://nymag.com/
intelligencer/2020/01/andrew-sullivan-america-needs-a-miracle.html [https://perma.cc/4TZH-
QEJN] (“[H]uman beings are tribal, psychologically primed to recognize in-group and out-
group before the frontal cortex gets a look-in.”); Jonathan Haidt, The Age of Outrage, CITY J.
(Dec. 17, 2017), https://www.city-journal.org/html/age-outrage-15608.html [https://perma.cc/
3GGE-RQ6X] (arguing that when young people learn about intersectionality it “turn[s] on
their ancient tribal circuits, preparing them for battle”).
7. Packer, supra note 5.
8. Andrew Sullivan, America Wasn’t Built for Humans, N.Y. MAG.: INTELLIGENCER
(Sept. 19, 2017), https://nymag.com/intelligencer/2017/09/can-democracy-survive-tribalism.
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treat other peoples “as some kind of alien.”9 Democracy requires
that we transcend these tribal attitudes and practices.10 As the
Founding Fathers well knew,11 “tribalism” and democracy are
incompatible.12
In America today, talk of “tribalism’s” incompatibility with
democracy often ignores American Indian Tribes.13 There is,
however, a long history of American leaders treating Indian
Tribalism as a threat to American democracy. The signers of the
Declaration of Independence offered the Crown’s support for
“merciless Indian Savages” as one of their reasons for declaring
independence.14 Such racist tropes have been a persistent feature of
U.S. history. Like the signers of the Declaration, President Ulysses
S. Grant saw Indian Tribalism as a threat when he authorized the
deputizing of Christian missionaries as Indian agents.15 When the
83rd Congress decided to pursue a policy of terminating Indian
Tribal governments, it too saw Indian Tribalism as a threat.16
html [https://perma.cc/9THZ-JH4H].
9. Id.
10. See Wheeler, supra note 4 (“Democracy requires us to overcome that tribalism ... in
the pursuit of a greater good.”); see also GOLDBERG, supra note 6, at 10, 13.
11. Amy Chua & Jed Rubenfeld, The Threat of Tribalism, ATLANTIC (Oct. 2018), https://
www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2018/10/the-threat-of-tribalism/568342/ [https://
perma.cc/W7CF-WQM2] (explaining that the Founding Fathers believed that political
tribalism threatened the constitutional order); Sullivan, supra note 8 (“Tribalism was an urge
our Founding Fathers assumed we could overcome.”).
12. See Elizabeth Rata, Discursive Strategies of the Maori Tribal Elite, 31 CRITIQUE
ANTHROPOLOGY 359, 361 (2011); see also Jonathan Rauch, Have Our Tribes Become More
Important than Our Country?, WASH.POST (Feb. 16, 2018, 1:41 PM), https://www.washington
post.com/outlook/have-our-tribes-become-more-important-than-our-country/2018/02/16/
2f8ef9b2-083a-11e8-b48c-b07fea957bd5_story.html [https://perma.cc/P8D9-DARZ]; Elizabeth
Rata, Tribalism, Democracy Incompatible, N.Z.HERALD (Jan. 29, 2013, 5:30 AM), https://www.
nzherald.co.nz/nz/news/article.cfm?c_id=1&objectid=10861949 [https://perma.cc/N7DS-B8YK].
13. But not always. See Sullivan, supra note 8 (referring to American Indian Tribes as
examples of “primitive tribes” whose historical interactions shed light on political dysfunction
today).
14. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 29 (U.S. 1776) (complaining that the
Crown had sought “to bring on the inhabitants of our Frontiers, the merciless Indian Savages,
whose known Rule of Warfare, is an undistinguished Destruction of all Ages, Sexes and
Conditions”).
15. See 1 FRANCIS PAUL PRUCHA, THE GREAT FATHER: THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
AND THE AMERICAN INDIANS 515-16 (1984).
16. See H.R. Con. Res. 108, 83d Cong., 67 Stat. B132 (1953).
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These “savage anxieties”17 are reflected in federal Indian law, that
body of federal law concerning American Indian Tribes. Indians
have persisted as self-governing peoples notwithstanding federal
policies designed to assimilate them.18 Indian Tribes’ powers of self-
government do not derive from the U.S. Constitution.19 As pre-
constitutional sovereigns, moreover, Indian Tribes are not bound by
the Bill of Rights,20 and may have structures of government and
substantive laws that are unfamiliar to students of American
democracy.21 Tribal governance, American judges have worried,
suffers a democracy deficit and therefore warrants a “chary” at-
titude from federal lawmakers.22 As Justice Anthony Kennedy put
it, because “[t]he Constitution is based on a theory of original, and
continuing, consent of the governed,” there is a serious constitu-
tional question regarding whether the federal government may
subject a U.S. citizen to Tribal sovereignty unless that citizen is also
a Tribal member.23 Such jurisdiction would be anomalous, or so
Justice Kennedy reasoned.24 Taken for all that view might suggest,
Indian Tribalism and American democracy are incompatible.
This Article critiques the incompatibility thesis. Americans have
long talked about “tribalism” as a way of talking about their
17. See generally ROBERT A. WILLIAMS, JR., SAVAGE ANXIETIES: THE INVENTION OF
WESTERN CIVILIZATION (2012).
18. See id. at 8-9.
19. See Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376, 384 (1896).
20. See id.
21. See Angela R. Riley, Good (Native) Governance, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1049, 1050-51
(2007).
22. Native Vill. of Venetie I.R.A. Council v. Alaska, 687 F. Supp. 1380, 1389 (D. Alaska
1988), rev’d, 918 F.2d 797 (9th Cir. 1990); see Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 679 (1990) (holding
that an Indian Tribe lacked criminal jurisdiction over an Indian who was not a citizen of that
Nation), superseded by statute, Act of Oct. 28, 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-137, 105 Stat. 646, United
States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 199-200 (2004); see also T.ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF,SEMBLANCES
OF SOVEREIGNTY: THE CONSTITUTION, THE STATE, AND AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP 115 (2002)
(discussing but not agreeing with the view that Tribal governance suffers a “democratic def-
icit”); Jessica A. Shoemaker, Transforming Property: Reclaiming Indigenous Land Tenures,
107 CALIF. L. REV. 1531, 1606 (2019) (considering “the democratic deficit problem of
unenfranchised non-Indian (or even nonmember Indian) landowners” in the context of Tribal
land tenure reform).
23. Lara, 541 U.S. at 212 (Kennedy, J., concurring); see Duro, 495 U.S. at 693 (concluding
that the Court should not “adopt a view of tribal sovereignty that would single out another
group of citizens, nonmember Indians, for trial by political bodies that do not include them”).
24. Lara, 541 U.S. at 212 (arguing it would be “unprecedented” to recognize Tribal
criminal jurisdiction over a nonconsenting U.S. citizen).
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democracy. Very little of this talk—within federal Indian law, and
also without it—has had much to do with the actual practices of
Indian Tribes. Just as the “primitive” Indian Tribes ruled by “crude
customs” of the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence are a myth,25 so too
the “primal” tribes ruled by “huge passions,”26 not by thought,27 are
a myth of the contemporary commentariat. The politics of actual
Indian Tribes are consistent with a conception of democracy as a
process of arriving at collective decisions based upon mutual
compromise and respect.28 This process requires empowering groups
to contest claims about the common interest through discourse and
negotiation, as well as historical memory about the times in which
those contests have been resolved through coercion and violence.
Thus, this Article argues that Indian Tribalism is compatible with
American democracy. Indian Tribal sovereignty ensures opportuni-
ties for self-government. Indian Tribal governance is compatible
with democracy because it depends in no small measure upon
discourse and negotiation, not upon coercion and zero-sum gaming,
as the Supreme Court recently recognized in McGirt v. Oklahoma.29
Indian Tribalism is part of the history of American democracy. The
persistence of Indian Tribes as self-governing peoples challenges
Americans to honor the democratic ideal of consent of the governed.
In all three ways, Indian Tribalism and American democracy are
compatible.30
25. United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28, 39 (1913); see Robert A. Williams, Jr., The
Algebra of Federal Indian Law: The Hard Trail of Decolonizing and Americanizing the White
Man’s Indian Jurisprudence, 1986 WIS. L. REV. 219, 262 n.146 (demonstrating that the
Supreme Court in Sandoval created a racist myth of primitiveness when discussing the
culture and lifeways of the Pueblo Indians).
26. Packer, supra note 5.
27. See Sullivan, supra note 8 (“One of the great attractions of tribalism is that you don’t
actually have to think very much.”).
28. See infra Part III.
29. See 140 S. Ct. 2452, 2467 (2020) (recognizing that the Creek Nation is a thriving
democracy and that it and the State of Oklahoma have a history of successful negotiations).
30. This Article builds upon Joseph Singer’s argument for Tribal sovereignty based upon
democracy. Joseph W. Singer, The Indian States of America: Parallel Universes & Overlapping
Sovereignty, 38 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 1, 13 (2013). It builds upon the work of Christine Mungai,
Lawrence Rosen, and Blake Smith, who have also critiqued the discourse of political
tribalism. See Lawrence Rosen, ‘Tribalism’ Gets a Bum Rap, 32 ANTHROPOLOGY TODAY 3, 3
(2016) (arguing that “by seeing tribes as closed, pre-modern, and pugnacious we distort our
political differences and risk further blundering in foreign wars”); Christine Mungai, Pundits
Who Decry ‘Tribalism’ Know Nothing About Real Tribes, WASH. POST. (Jan. 30, 2019, 10:21
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This Article’s overarching aim is to call “tribalism” into question
as a tool for thinking about what ails American democracy.31 At
times in the commentary, “tribe” and “tribalism” seem empty
signifiers that tell us nothing because they try to tell us too much
about human groups. When commentators try to give these terms
content—when, for example, some of them cite Indian Tribes as
examples—they fail to take seriously actual Tribal polities and
histories. The discourse of “tribalism” versus “democracy” has
justified ongoing practices of colonial rule and denied the ways in
which Indian Tribes are part of American democracy. Indian Tribal
politics have reflected the very sort of democratic attitudes and
practices that commentators embrace. Invoking abstract conceptions
of “tribalism” does little to help us think through hard questions
about the place of Indian Tribes within American democracy, much
less questions about the dysfunctions of American democracy.
The argument unfolds in three Parts. Part I defines “tribalism”
and “democracy” as contested and contestable terms, and suggests,
therefore, that we should be skeptical of conceptual generalizations
about them. Focused analysis of how particular societies act and
interact is a more useful methodology in thinking through problems
AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/pundits-who-decry-tribalism-know-nothing-
about-real-tribes/2019/01/29/8d14eb44-232f-11e9-90cd-dedb0c92dc17_story.html [https://
perma.cc/C3TT-Z4GZ] (arguing that the term “tribal” evokes an image that “has much more
to do with Western stereotypes than how people who have a tribal identity behave”);
Lawrence Rosen, A Liberal Defense of Tribalism, FOREIGN POL’Y (Jan. 16, 2018), https://
foreignpolicy.com/2018/01/16/a-liberal-defense-of-tribalism-american-politics/ [https://perma.
cc/8PNT-DNEM] (arguing “that most commentators vastly misunderstand the nature of
tribes”); Blake Smith, Who’s Afraid of Tribalism?, QUILLETTE (June 1, 2018), https://
quillette.com/2018/06/01/whos-afraid-tribalism/ [https://perma.cc/5PNF-75DG] (arguing that
“[t]racing the history of ‘tribalism’ from its origins in the nineteenth century to its central
place in today’s headlines reveals how powerful insiders have sought to delegitimize their
opponents by presenting them as irrational primitives”). In exploring how the discourse of
tribalism has surfaced within federal Indian law, moreover, this Article adds to the literature
on what various visions of democracy might entail for particular areas of law. See, e.g., David
Alan Sklansky, Police and Democracy, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1699, 1699 (2005) (asking, “What
constraints does a commitment to democracy place on law enforcement?”); Shelley Welton,
Grasping for Energy Democracy, 116 MICH. L. REV. 581, 585 (2018) (arguing that the “lack of
clarity over what ‘energy democracy’ entails presents a troubling hurdle to” energy law
reform).
31. My argument is not that a common use of “tribalism” should be abandoned simply
because it is offensive, although my discussion of the history of the discourse of tribalism
lends support to such an argument. See infra Part II.B (discussing “tribalism”).
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of democratic governance.32 Part II sketches the thesis that
tribalism and democracy are incompatible, shows how this thesis
surfaces within federal Indian law, and critiques the thesis. Part III
makes the affirmative case that Indian Tribalism is consistent with
American democracy. The Article concludes by arguing that
commentators should abandon the trope of “tribalism” in their
discussions of the dysfunctions of democracy.
I. “DEMOCRACY” AND “TRIBALISM”
The incompatibility thesis holds that tribalism is a threat to
democracy.33 But what is “democracy”? And what is the “tribalism”
that threatens it? “Democracy” is what W.B. Gallie called an
“essentially contested concept[ ],”34 with descriptive and evaluative
components and disagreement about what the core cases are.35 On
one conception, some Tribal societies may be more democratic than
the United States itself.36
A. Democracy
Many people agree that democracy is a good thing, but disagree
about what democracy means. The answer is that it is contestable.
It is common to say that democracy is a political system that
requires consent of the governed, but how is that consent sought?37
Perhaps democracy requires the regular selection of representatives
32. See infra notes 53-54 and accompanying text.
33. See infra Part II.
34. See W.B. Gallie, Essentially Contested Concepts, 56 PROC. ARISTOTELIAN SOC’Y 167,
169 (1955).
35. See Jeremy Waldron, Is the Rule of Law an Essentially Contested Concept (in
Florida)?, 21 L. & PHIL. 137, 149 (2002) (“One way of getting at Gallie’s idea is to say that the
term ‘essentially’ refers to the location of disagreement or indeterminacy: it is contestation
at the core, not just at the borderlines or penumbra of a concept.”).
36. See, e.g., Wenona T. Singel, The First Federalists, 62 DRAKE L. REV. 775, 833 (2014)
(“[T]ribal governance affords extensive opportunities for democratic participation that eclipse
opportunities in state and federal governments.”).
37. See DAVID STASAVAGE, THE DECLINE AND RISE OF DEMOCRACY: A GLOBAL HISTORY
FROM ANTIQUITY TO TODAY 4 (2020) (defining democracy as a political system “in which those
who rule have been obliged to seek consent from those they govern” and distinguishing
between how that consent is sought in early democracies and in modern democracies).
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in competitive elections in which every citizen can vote.38 Or maybe
it means local self-determination and grassroots organization.39
There are other, more substantive definitions. Perhaps democracy
is a way of living with each other. Maybe, for instance, it means
minimum standards for how we interact, ranging from norms of
equal concern and respect to respect for autonomy and free ex-
change.40
The incompatibility thesis suggests a vision of democracy that
includes how we relate to each other. In Against Identity Politics:
The New Tribalism and the Crisis of Democracy, for example,
Francis Fukuyama is concerned that “tribalism” threatens a way of
living with each other that is necessary for democracy.41 In par-
ticular, he argues that “[d]emocratic societies are fracturing into
segments based on ever-narrower identities, threatening the pos-
sibility of deliberation and collective action by society as a whole.”42
Thus, Fukuyama worries that “tribalism” undermines democratic
attitudes and democratic practices necessary for democracies to
function.
Which attitudes and practices are democratic? This answer too is
contestable.
Of Greek origin, the term originally referred to a political ar-
rangement under which the people are the “governing body.”43 As
Aristotle put it, “[W]hat is held to be democracy or rule of the people
above all is what results from the sort of justice that is agreed to be
38. See, e.g., William H. Riker & Barry R. Weingast, Constitutional Regulation of
Legislative Choice: The Political Consequences of Judicial Deference to Legislatures, 74 VA. L.
REV. 373, 397 (1988) (describing the liberal conception that “democracy consists of holding
regular elections and hence providing a popular veto on recent legislative action,” and
distinguishing this conception from the populist one in which “democracy consists of
embodying the ‘will of the people’ into law”).
39. See, e.g., Lani Guinier, Supreme Democracy: Bush v. Gore Redux, 34 LOY. U. CHI. L.J.
23, 63 (2002) (arguing that “grassroots organization ... is crucial to re-invigorating American
democracy”).
40. For a conception of democracy along these lines applied to property law, see Joseph
William Singer, Essay, Democratic Estates: Property Law in a Free and Democratic Society,
94 CORNELL L. REV. 1009, 1051-55 (2009).
41. Francis Fukuyama, Against Identity Politics: The New Tribalism and the Crisis of
Democracy, 97 FOREIGN AFFS. 90, 93 (2018).
42. Id.
43. ARISTOTLE, POLITICS bk. III, at 71-72 (Carnes Lord trans., Univ. of Chi. Press 2d ed.
2013).
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democratic, which is all having equal share on the basis of
number.”44 Under a democratic system, there is “election to all
offices from among all,” with most offices “of short duration”;
governance is based upon the “rule of all over each, and of each over
all in turn”; and “the assembly,” not specific individuals, have
“authority over all matters or the greatest.”45 Thus understood,
democracy connotes direct rule by citizenry.
If direct rule is what democracy requires, then the United States
government is not democratic. Rather, the United States is a
representative government that selects representatives through
elections and develops policy through public administration.46
Indeed, on this definition, some American Indian Tribal govern-
ments are more democratic than the United States.47
The modern definition of “democracy,” however, is not limited to
direct democratic rule by popular assemblies. Rather, “democracy”
may refer to principles of representative government and popular
sovereignty.48 Montesquieu defined democracy as “[w]hen the body
of the people [possesses] the supreme power” and exercises its
sovereignty through voting for government officials.49 This definition
finds expression in the U.S. Constitution’s vision of one “We the
People”50 as sovereign, and in Tocqueville’s description of the U.S.
political system: “The people rule the American political world as
God rules the universe.”51 Thus, democracies are based upon consent
of the governed. Modern democracy is self-government of the people
but does not require direct rule by them.
It may, however, require particular attitudes and practices. At
least, that is the concern of commentators on political tribalism. At
44. Id. bk. VI, at 174.
45. Id., at 173.
46. See, e.g., Edward L. Rubin, Getting Past Democracy, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 711, 714
(2001).
47. See Singel, supra note 36, at 833 (arguing that Tribal governance is more participatory
and therefore more democratic).
48. See Philippe C. Schmitter & Terry Lynn Karl, What Democracy Is ... and Is Not, 2 J.
DEMOCRACY 75, 76-77 (1991).
49. BARON DE MONTESQUIEU (CHARLES DE SECONDAT), THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS 8-9
(Thomas Nugant trans., Colonial Press 1900) (1748).
50. U.S. CONST. pmbl.
51. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, 1 DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 97 (Eduardo Nolla ed., James T.
Schleifer trans., Liberty Fund 2012) (1835-40).
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its core, democracy requires an attitude of mutual respect and
practices of deliberation, negotiation, and collective action.52
Tribalism threatens these attitudes and practices, or so the concern
runs.
To take this concern seriously requires, attention to actual
practices and interactions. Methodologically, as Edward Rubin has
argued, a more useful approach than conceptual analysis is “mi-
croanalysis of the actual interactions between the government and
its citizens.”53 This methodology requires an “effort to describe
human activities on an operational level, to trace the way that
individuals actually interact without relying on overly conceptual
generalizations about either society or individual behavior.”54 While
this Article does not offer a microanalysis of a particular Indian
Tribal Nation’s history and practices, it argues that consideration
of actual histories, practices, and politics of Indian Tribal Nations
calls into question premises of the incompatibility thesis.
B. Tribalism
Thus, this Article questions the usefulness of abstract conceptions
of “tribalism” as much as it questions abstractions about democracy.
The incompatibility thesis uses the term “tribalism” sweepingly to
refer to groups of human beings tied together by common interests.55
Tribalism, the thesis presumes, is a potential feature of all human
groupings.56 It is therefore useful to compare, say, Indian Tribes
with the Democratic and Republican parties,57 or street gangs with
megachurches.58 As one commentator ascribed, “There are hip-hop
and country-music tribes; bros; nerds; Wasps; Dead Heads and
52. See Fukuyama, supra note 41, at 93; see also infra Part II.A (specifying different types
of democratic attitudes and practices that commentators have discussed).
53.  Rubin, supra note 46, at 791-92.
54. Id. at 713; see Edward L. Rubin, The New Legal Process, the Synthesis of Discourse,
and the Microanalysis of Institutions, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1393, 1425 (1996) (describing
microanalysis as “refer[ring] to the postmodern emphasis on the particular and its cor-
responding distrust of generalization”).
55. See supra notes 3-6 and accompanying text.
56. See, e.g., Sullivan, supra note 6.
57. Sullivan, supra note 8.
58. See CHUA, supra note 2, at 149-53.
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Packers fans; Facebook groups.”59 This sort of abstraction turns
“tribe” into little more than a stand-in for any group and “tribalism”
into little more than an epithet.
Originally, the term had a precise meaning. The word “tribe”
stems from the Latin tribus, which did not refer generally to groups
of human beings with common interests, but instead to units of
voting and public administration within ancient Rome.60
Within the modern era, popular uses of the terms “tribe” and
“tribalism” can be traced back to European colonialism and
anthropology.61 The incompatibility thesis’s use of these terms to
refer to “primal”62 forms of human organization has many of the
same problems as the anthropological uses of the terms during the
nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The association of “tribe” and
“tribalism” with primitiveness emerged in the sixteenth and
seventeenth centuries with European colonialism.63 Enlightenment
Era thinkers developed the evolutionary claim that Tribal societies
were less advanced than European societies and existed “outside the
pale of civil society”64—a claim echoed in assertions about Indian
Tribalism’s incompatibility with democracy today. In 1877, Lewis
Henry Morgan developed this claim into a theory of the evolution of
human societies from “savagery” towards “civilization.”65 For much
of the twentieth century, anthropologists used the term “tribe” as a
unit of analysis.66 And during this period, “tribalism was understood
as the attribute of tribes and of tribesmen who demonstrate loyalty
and adherence to tribal ways of doing things.”67
59. Sullivan, supra note 8.
60. David Sneath, Tribe, in THE CAMBRIDGE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ANTHROPOLOGY (F. Stein
et al. eds., 2016), https://www.anthroencyclopedia.com/entry/tribe [https://perma.cc/X7L9-
6TY5].
61. See Elizabeth Colson, Political Organization in Tribal Societies: A Cross-Cultural
Comparison, 10 AM. INDIAN Q. 5, 5-6 (1986).
62. Packer, supra note 5.
63. See Malcolm Yapp, Tribes and States in the Khyber, 1838-42, in THE CONFLICT OF
TRIBE AND STATE IN IRAN AND AFGHANISTAN 150, 154 (Richard Tapper ed., 1983).
64. Id.
65. LEWIS H. MORGAN, ANCIENT SOCIETY 102-03 (1877).
66. See, e.g., A.R.RADCLIFFE-BROWN, STRUCTURE AND FUNCTION IN PRIMITIVE SOCIETY 15
(1952); Marshall D. Sahlins, The Segmentary Lineage: An Organization of Predatory
Expansion, 63 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 322, 325 (1961).
67. Peter P. Ekeh, Social Anthropology and Two Contrasting Uses of Tribalism in Africa,
32 COMPAR. STUD. SOC’Y & HIST. 660, 687 (1990).
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The incompatibility thesis emerged in the twentieth century as a
way of talking about threats to liberalism. As Blake Smith has
explained, this usage crystallized in the work of Karl Popper,68 who
contrasted the “closed society” with the “open society.”69 Tribal
societies are those in which an individual “will rarely find himself
in the position of doubting how he ought to act.”70 Such societies are
closed. By contrast, liberal democracies, “in which individuals are
confronted with personal decisions,” are open.71 Contrasting “early
Greek tribal society” with the Athenian Empire, Popper argues
“that tribalist exclusiveness and self-sufficiency could be superseded
only by some form of imperialism.”72 Popper thus drew the outlines
of contemporary usages of the term “tribalism” in the incompatibil-
ity thesis: Tribalism is an inherent tendency towards group-think
in human societies that precludes individual thought and must be
continually be transcended.73
Ultimately, however, anthropologists began to question the term
“tribe” as a tool of analysis.74 Even Popper acknowledged that “there
is ... no uniformity in tribalism” and “no standardized ‘tribal way of
life.’”75 By the 1960s, the terms “tribe” and “tribalism” had become
fraught for the largely white and Euro-American anthropological
profession to use, given antiracist and decolonial struggles.76
Conceptually, moreover, the term had become the subject of
“massive disagreement.”77 As Elizabeth Colson wrote in 1968, “We
use the term [tribe] in many ways for many different phenomena
68. Smith, supra note 30.
69. KARL R. POPPER, 1 THE OPEN SOCIETY AND ITS ENEMIES: THE SPELL OF PLATO 173 (4th
ed. 1963).
70. Id. at 172.
71. See id. at 173.
72. Id. at 181.
73. See Smith, supra note 30 (arguing that recent commentary on tribalism descends from
Popper’s The Open Society and Its Enemies). Smith explains that “[t]he end of the Cold War
and the apparent triumph of liberal democratic capitalism brought the Popperian language
of ‘tribalism’ into the mainstream of political commentary.” Id. (citing as an example
BENJAMIN BARBER, JIHAD V. MCWORLD: HOW GLOBALISM AND TRIBALISM ARE RESHAPING THE
WORLD (1996)).
74. See Ekeh, supra note 67, at 687.
75. POPPER, supra note 69, at 172.
76. See Ekeh, supra note 67, at 660.
77. Elizabeth Colson, Contemporary Tribes and the Development of Nationalism, in
ESSAYS ON THE PROBLEM OF TRIBE 201, 201 (June Helm ed., 1968).
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and for many different purposes.”78 In that same year, Morton Fried
argued that “what are generally designated by anthropologists as
tribes represent neither a definite type of society nor a definite stage
of evolution.”79
As a result of these critiques, “social anthropologists more or less
agreed to abandon the use of the tribe and of its more obvious
derivative tribalism,”80 although its usage has persisted in popular
discourse. Within Africa, for example, the term “tribalism” may be
one of opprobrium in the same way that it is a term of opprobrium
within the incompatibility thesis.81 In this usage, “tribalism refers
to obnoxious modes of behavior in multiethnic circumstances that
threaten and endanger normal coexistence.”82
Within the United States, the term “tribe” has not only a popular
meaning, but also a legal and political one. Federal law recognizes
“Indian tribes” as preconstitutional sovereigns separate from the
federal government.83 Under Montoya v. United States, an Indian
“tribe” is defined as “a body of Indians of the same or a similar race,
united in a community under one leadership or government, and
inhabiting a particular though sometimes ill-defined territory.”84
Critics of this definition see it “as [resting upon] generalized
ethnological categories,”85 the sorts of categories that anthropolo-
gists have largely abandoned.
Many Indians, however, use “tribe” as well as “nation” to refer to
their political communities.86 In this usage, Indian Tribalism is
“best represented by the concept of ‘tribal sovereignty.’”87 It denotes
78. Id.
79. André Béteille, The Concept of Tribe with Special Reference to India, 27 EUR.J.SOCIO.
297, 305 (1986) (citing M. Fried, On the Concepts of “Tribe” and “Tribal Society,” in ESSAYS
ON THE PROBLEM OF TRIBE 15 (J. Helm ed., 1968)).
80. Ekeh, supra note 67, at 660.
81. See infra Part II.A.
82. Ekeh, supra note 67, at 688.
83. See United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 557 (1975).
84. Montoya v. United States, 180 U.S. 261, 266 (1901).
85. Gerald Torres & Kathryn Milun, Translating Yonnondio by Precedent and Evidence:
The Mashpee Indian Case, 1990 DUKE L.J. 625, 634.
86. Rebecca Tsosie, Tribalism, Constitutionalism, and Cultural Pluralism: Where Do
Indigenous Peoples Fit Within Civil Society?, 5 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 357, 358 (2003).
87. Id. at 360.
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“the efforts of indigenous groups to define their political and
cultural identity as separate from that of the larger nation-state.”88
Thus, “tribe” and “tribalism” are contested concepts,89 though one
would not realize it from reading the commentary on tribalism’s
supposed incompatibility with democracy.
II. THE INCOMPATIBILITY THESIS
This Part sketches the incompatibility thesis, shows how it
surfaces within federal Indian law, and critiques the thesis’s
conceptions of Indian Tribalism and democracy.
A. Political Tribes and Democracy
Ours is a time of great anxiety among the proponents of liberal
democracy. This anxiety springs from many sources. With rising
inequality, for instance, comes the concern that “democracy [will]
give[ ] way to oligarchy.”90 Democratic politics has become dysfunc-
tional as a result of partisan polarization.91 And democratic
norms—mutual respect and toleration, a willingness to compromise,
and the like—are eroding.92 The “true anthem of [liberal democracy]
is: ‘We can work it out.’”93 Yet it seems increasingly likely that we
cannot.
Why is that? One answer is “tribalism.” The incompatibility
thesis holds that various social groups within the nation state have
become “tribal” and that their “tribalism” threatens liberal democ-
racy.94 Such groups may include not only ethnic groups and religious
communities, but also political parties.95 Under the incompatibility
88. Id. at 359.
89. Some concepts are contested and contestable without being “essentially contested
concepts.” See Waldron, supra note 35, at 148-50. “Tribe” and “tribalism” seem to be contested
without being essentially contestable, although their sweeping usages in the literature on
political tribalism may suggest otherwise.
90. TIMOTHY SNYDER, THE ROAD TO UNFREEDOM: RUSSIA, EUROPE, AMERICA 15 (2018).
91. STEVEN LEVITSKY & DANIEL ZIBLATT, HOW DEMOCRACIES DIE 2 (2018).
92. See id. at 124, 134, 143, 174-75, 213.
93. KWAME ANTHONY APPIAH, THE LIES THAT BIND: RETHINKING IDENTITY 103 (2018).
94. See Fukuyama, supra note 41, at 93; Packer, supra note 5.
95. See Matt Lewis, America’s Political Parties Are Just Tribes Now, DAILY BEAST (Apr.
13, 2017, 5:56 PM), https://www.thedailybeast.com/americas-political-parties-are-just-tribes-
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thesis, political parties, like tribes, demand strict identification with
the group and view their relationships with other groups as a zero-
sum competition.96 Similar to tribes, political parties feel constantly
under threat from others and are unable to reach compromise based
upon the mutual give-and-take that democracy requires.97 This
political tribalism is difficult for democracies to resolve, not only
because “tribalism” is a “primal”98 instinct, but also because in
democracies today, an increasingly diverse set of groups feels
constantly under threat, and none are able to seize a stable base of
power from which to forge compromise.99
The core idea seems to be that “tribal” attitudes and practices
clash with “democratic” attitudes and practices.100 Certain at-
titudes—thinking of ourselves as individuals, viewing our political
opponents as human beings who are due equal concern and respect,
and transcending loyalty to our particular group—are characteristi-
cally democratic. And certain practices, such as deliberating and
negotiating with our opponents rather than seeking to vanquish
them, are democratic. Tribalism is incompatible with these attitudes
and practices.
The incompatibility thesis begins with the claim that human
beings naturally form tribes and hold “tribal” attitudes. Humans
have a “tribal instinct.”101 Our brains are hardwired for it.102 We
instinctually need to belong to groups.103 And we “will sacrifice, and
even kill and die,” for our tribes.104 Tribes, moreover, demand such
sacrifice. The incompatibility thesis presumes that tribal organiza-
tions require uncompromising loyalty and identification with the
now [https: //perma.cc/RD5E-C33Q].
96. See Sullivan, supra note 8.
97. See Packer, supra note 5.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. While commentators do not all subscribe to the same set of arguments in favor of the
thesis, and some might very well reject particular arguments or implications of those
arguments, the premises sketched here appear repeatedly throughout the commentary.
101. CHUA, supra note 2, at 5; see GOLDBERG, supra note 6, at 62 (“Humans were not
designed to live in the market order of contracts, money, or impersonal rules, never mind huge
societies governed by a centralized state.”).
102. See CHUA, supra note 2, at 40.
103. See id.
104. Id. at 1.
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tribe.105 Tribal loyalties are exclusive: you are either with us or
against us.106 While tribal membership can be a source of pride,107
tribes think in “us-versus-them” terms whenever they believe they
are under threat.108 When in power, tribes “do not give up their
dominance easily.”109 When out of power, tribes close ranks in
response to threats.110 The result is a zero-sum game among every
tribe.111
“Tribalism” subsumes the individual within a group. Tribes are
“badges of identity, not of thought.”112 Those who wear a tribal
badge do not think for themselves. Instead, their group thinks for
them.113 That is true no matter one’s level of education; in fact,
tribal bias may be more likely among the highly educated.114 Thus,
tribalism “distorts the way we think and feel.”115 As one much-cited
study found, “Once a country has become tribalized, debates about
contested issues ... become shaped by larger tribal identities. Policy
debate gives way to tribal conflicts.”116
In sum, according to the incompatibility thesis, there is an
instinct that leads humans naturally to organize into groups that
suppress individual thought and treat other groups as enemies to be
105. Id. at 5; Packer, supra note 5 (“Tribes demand loyalty, and in return they confer the
security of belonging.”).
106. See Packer, supra note 5.
107. CHUA, supra note 2, at 191 (“People want to see their own tribe as exceptional, as
something to be deeply proud of; that’s what the tribal instinct is all about.”).
108. Packer, supra note 5 (“To give an inch to the other tribe makes you a sucker.”).
109. CHUA, supra note 2, at 61.
110. See id. at 60-61.
111. GOLDBERG, supra note 6, at 10-12; Packer, supra note 5 (“When politics becomes a
perpetual tribal war, ends justify almost any means and individuals are absolved from the
constraints of normal decency.”).
112. Packer, supra note 5; see also Sullivan, supra note 6 (“[H]uman beings are tribal,
psychologically primed to recognize in-group and out-group before the frontal cortex gets a
look-in.”).
113. Packer, supra note 5 (“[Tribes] make thinking unnecessary, because they do it for you,
and may punish you if you try to do it for yourself.”).
114. See CHUA, supra note 2, at 101-02 (“The better informed people are, and the better
educated, the more polarized they tend to be on politically controversial factual issues, and
the more stubbornly they manipulate new facts to support their tribe’s worldview.”).
115. Id. at 41.
116. STEPHEN HAWKINS, DANIEL YUDKIN, MIRIAM JUAN-TORRES & TIM DIXON, HIDDEN
TRIBES: A STUDY OF AMERICA’S POLARIZED LANDSCAPE 4 (2018), https://hiddentribes.us/
[https://perma.cc/D8PQ-Z29L].
448 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62:431
vanquished. These attitudes and practices are not consistent with
democracy, which must transcend them to succeed.
Today, liberal democracies are losing the battle. “Tribalism,” for
example, is “corrupting” American politics.117 There are many
putative causes, ranging from rising inequality to identity politics.118
Democracy, it turns out, is fragile; it requires maintenance, lest
tribalism be reborn.119
Tribal attitudes, commentators warn, threaten the national unity
that is necessary for democracy to thrive. Democracy requires that
we develop an “Über-tribe that constitutes the nation-state.”120
While tribal life subsumes the individual, the nation must subsume
the tribe for democracy to work.121 When “tribalism” “rivals our
attachment to the nation as a whole,” democracy is threatened.122
To forge what Amy Chua calls a “super-group”—a national
identity larger than tribes, but smaller than all of humanity—is a
perilous enterprise.123 Most countries fail to build super-groups.124
Perhaps Great Britain achieved it.125 Rome did too.126 While
American democracy continues to struggle to achieve its promise of
one “We the People,” that promise is under threat from American
tribalism.
Now, perhaps, we should not take these uses of “tribe” and
“tribalism” too seriously. Maybe “tribalism” is just a label, and one
could substitute “antidemocratic” or “illiberal” for “tribal” without
changing the analysis. Some commentary suggests as much.127 Even
117. Sullivan, supra note 8.
118. Compare GOLDBERG, supra note 6, at 307 (“One obvious but partial reason is that the
economy has been failing large swaths of Americans.”), with Fukuyama, supra note 41, at 90
(using “The New Tribalism” as a synonym for “the rise of identity politics”).
119. GOLDBERG, supra note 6, at 66.
120. Sullivan, supra note 8.
121. Id. (arguing that democracy requires a “core unit of belonging”).
122. Id.; see CHUA, supra note 2, at 12 (“America’s continued existence as a super-group is
under tremendous strain today.”).
123. CHUA, supra note 2, at 12; see also Sullivan, supra note 8 (“The project of American
democracy—to live beyond such tribal identities, to construct a society based on the
individual, to see ourselves as citizens of a people’s republic, to place religion off-limits, and
even in recent years to embrace a multiracial and post-religious society—was always an
extremely precarious endeavor.”).
124. CHUA, supra note 2, at 22 (“[F]or a country to be a super-group is extremely rare.”).
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. In Fukuyama’s analysis, for instance, nothing seems to turn on his use of the term
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so, it is worth asking why the commentary uses “tribal” rather than
“antidemocratic” or “illiberal.” One commentator has an answer: the
word “tribal” is appropriate because of its “primal” connotations.128
“Tribalism” cannot, it appears, be so easily separated from a
discourse that describes some human societies and the people
within in terms of racist stereotypes.129
B. The Incompatibility Thesis in Federal Indian Law
Some commentators have pointed to American Indian Tribes as
examples to prove the incompatibility thesis. The history of actual
Tribes, it is argued, supports the premises of the thesis. For
instance, the fact that European settlers “joined Indian society” in
North America shows the “captivating” appeal of Indian Tribalism,
which speaks to our universal tribal instinct.130 This tribal instinct
is destructive of democracies, including the United States, where
“tribalism” apparently explains the Civil War as well as the rise of
authoritarianism today.131
Such an account is ahistorical. To write of “the centuries in which
white Europeans lived alongside Native American tribes” as if these
centuries have long since passed, or to assert that “[c]omparatively
“new tribalism.” Fukuyama, supra note 41, at 90. Rather, as the title of his article suggests,
that term is a label for “identity politics.” See id. Although Fukuyama states that “there is
nothing wrong with identity politics as such,” his use of “tribalism” underscores his criticisms
of identity politics. See id. at 100. For recent discussions and arguments that the term
“identity politics” as developed in the 1977 Combahee River Collective Statement has been
repeatedly misconstrued and mischaracterized, see HOW WE GET FREE: BLACK FEMINISM AND
THE COMBAHEE RIVER COLLECTIVE (Keeanga-Yamahtta Taylor, ed. 2017) (presenting the 1977
statement and commentary by the founding members of the Combahee River Collective);
Olúf mi O. Táíwò, Identity Politics and Elite Capture, BOS. REV. (May 7, 2020), http://
bostonreview.net/race/olufemi-o-taiwo-identity-politics-and-elite-capture [https://perma.cc/
AF7J-85MW].
128. See Packer, supra note 5 (arguing that to describe “American politics today requires
a word as primal as ‘tribe’ to get at the blind allegiances and huge passions of partisan
affiliation”).
129. See Mungai, supra note 30 (“The current use of ‘tribal’ is based on a racist stereotype
about how groups of such peoples have interacted historically, and even today.”).
130. Sullivan, supra note 8; see also GOLDBERG, supra note 6, at 13 (“[T]he English colonies
in North America were vexed by a bizarre problem: Thousands of white European colonists
desperately wanted to be Indians, but virtually no Indians wanted to be Europeans.”).
131. Sullivan, supra note 8.
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few actual tribes exist today,” is to forget Native Nations live
alongside non-Natives today.132
The seeds of this sort of talk were sown long ago. For example, in
1823 Chief Justice John Marshall wrote in Johnson v. M’Intosh that
“the tribes of Indians inhabiting this country were fierce savages,
whose occupation was war.”133 Today, one commentator has written
that among “primitive societies,” including Indian Tribes, “warfare
was normal.”134 These “discourses of conquest” are nothing if not
persistent.135
Within federal Indian law, the incompatibility thesis has reflected
racist premises about the savagery and exclusionary politics of
tribes. Historically, American lawmakers and politicians opined that
Indian Tribes threatened American democracy. These ideas
underwrote policies of assimilation and termination of Indian Tribes
that still shape modern federal Indian law.
Today, some Supreme Court Justices have reasoned that Indian
Tribal governance, particularly over nonmembers, is suspect
because Indian Tribes suffer a “democratic deficit.”136 Although less
crisply articulated than the commentary on political tribalism, this
“democratic deficit” claim is a version of the incompatibility thesis.
By tracing how the incompatibility thesis has surfaced within
federal Indian law, we may better understand its history and the
problems with its premises.
1. Within U.S. Territory, but Outside American Democracy? 
There are 574 Indian Tribes recognized by the United States
as preconstitutional sovereigns with the “right ... to make their
own laws and be ruled by them.”137 Federal recognition entails a
132. Id.
133. Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 590 (1823).
134. GOLDBERG, supra note 6, at 31, 33.
135. See ROBERT A. WILLIAMS, JR., THE AMERICAN INDIAN IN WESTERN LEGAL THOUGHTS:
THE DISCOURSES OF CONQUEST 316-17 (1990) (discussing the persistence of Eurocentric racist
beliefs reflected in Johnson v. M’Intosh).
136. See supra note 22.
137. Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 220 (1959).
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government-to-government relationship between the United States
and an Indian Tribe.138
In exercising their powers of self-government, Indian Tribes have
the authority to enact and enforce civil and criminal laws.139 They
are clothed with sovereign immunity under federal law.140 And
although Congress stopped the practice of treaty-making in 1871,141
Indian Tribes may enter into intergovernmental agreements with
the federal government, states, or cities and counties.142
Many Indian Tribes have government structures that would be
familiar to students of American democracy, while others do not.
For example, approximately 161 Indian Tribes adopted constitu-
tions under the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 (IRA).143 The IRA
constitutions create political offices and voting systems that
resemble those of states and the federal government.144 Quite a few
Indian Tribes rejected the IRA constitutions,145 though they may
have democratic political systems. Some Indian Tribes, however,
have forms of self-government that do not conform to liberal
democratic norms.146 Even so, “tribal governance [often] affords
extensive opportunities for democratic participation that eclipse
opportunities in state and federal governments.”147
Citizenship in an Indian Tribe is membership in a political
community.148 Tribal membership criteria are based partly on
kinship and descent, though that was not always the case for all
Indian Tribes, and in some cases has a lot to do with the history of
138. See Seth Davis, The Constitution of Our Tribal Republic, 65 UCLA L. REV. 1460, 1462
(2018).
139. See Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 687-88 (1990).
140. See Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 572 U.S. 782, 808-04 (2014).
141. See, e.g., VINE DELORIA JR.&DAVID E.WILKINS, TRIBES,TREATIES,&CONSTITUTIONAL
TRIBULATIONS 61-62 (1999).
142. See infra Part III.B.2.
143. CAROLE E. GOLDBERG, REBECCA TSOSIE, KEVIN K. WASHBURN & ELIZABETH RODKE
WASHBURN, AMERICAN INDIAN LAW: NATIVE NATIONS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 234 (2015).
144. See Riley, supra note 21, at 1076-77.
145. See GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 143, at 234.
146. See Riley, supra note 21, at 1100 (“In reality, there are tribes with functioning
governments and stable economies that do not maintain democracies.”).
147. Singel, supra note 36, at 833.
148. See Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 554 (1974); Bethany R. Berger, Race, Descent,
and Tribal Citizenship, 4 CAL. L. REV. CIR. 23, 27-29 (2013).
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federal Indian policy, not with traditional Tribal norms.149 As a
result, individuals who live within an Indian Tribe’s territory may
be ineligible to become Tribal citizens, though in some cases they
may have other opportunities to participate in Tribal governance.150
Indian Tribes claim sovereign authority over their territories.
Much of Indian Country has been specifically recognized—and thus
demarcated as Indian lands—by treaties or other forms of positive
law, such as federal statutes or executive orders.151 The territorial
aspect of Tribal sovereignty also means that Indian Tribes have the
authority to regulate noncitizens on their territories. This territorial
sovereignty has fueled many of the democratic deficit critiques of
Tribal governance.152 Tribal regulation of Tribal members (or
nonmember Indians) may be one thing, the Supreme Court has
reasoned, but Tribal regulation of nonmembers (or non-Indians)
may be another thing altogether.153 The Court, for example, has held
that Indian Tribes may not criminally prosecute non-Indians who
commit crimes in Indian territories.154 This “implicit divestiture
doctrine,” so-named because it involves judicial implication of limits
on Tribal sovereignty, is an example of the ways in which the
federal courts have struggled to make sense of Indian Tribes’ place
both within U.S. territory and outside the U.S. constitutional
order.155
In sum, Indian Tribes are outside the American democratic
system in several senses. They are not bound by the Bill of Rights
149. See, e.g., Berger, supra note 148, at 27-28; Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Race and the
American Indian, 11 WYO. L. REV. 295, 296 (2011).
150. One example is jury duty. See, e.g., Julia M. Bedell, The Fairness of Tribal Court
Juries and Non-Indian Defendants, 41 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 253, 271-72 (2017) (discussing the
Pascua Yaqui Tribe’s decision to add nine hundred non-Indians to its jury pools, but noting
that a Tribal court may be unable to enforce a jury summons against non-Indians).
151. See Seth Davis, American Colonialism and Constitutional Redemption, 105 CALIF. L.
REV. 1751, 1799-1800 (2017) (explaining the distinction between aboriginal title, which Indian
Tribes may claim based upon historical occupation of their lands, and recognized title, which
is based upon positive federal law such as treaties, statutes, or executive orders).
152. See infra Part II.B (discussing the incompatibility thesis and versions of the dem-
ocratic deficit critique).
153. See Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 210-12 (1978).
154. Id. at 195.
155. N. Bruce Duthu, Implicit Divestiture of Tribal Powers: Locating Legitimate Sources
of Authority in Indian Country, 19 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 353, 380-88 (1994) (discussing the
impact Oliphant had on implicit divestiture and the conflict over which test should govern its
application).
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itself or other constitutional provisions that limit the federal
government and the states.156 Tribal citizenship rules limit those
U.S. citizens who may become Tribal citizens.157 Indian Tribes are
free to adopt government structures and substantive laws that do
not conform to American liberal democratic norms, and there are
Tribes that have done so.158
2. Indian Tribalism as a Threat to American Democracy
A long history exists of federal lawmakers treating Indian
Tribalism as a threat to American democracy. Today, that threat is
reflected in a suspicion of Tribal governance and the argument that
Tribal governance suffers a “democratic deficit.”159
a. The Incompatibility Thesis Within the History of Federal
Indian Law
When declaring their independence from the Crown, the Ameri-
can colonies listed among King George III’s many abuses of power
that he had “endeavoured to bring on the Inhabitants of our Fron-
tiers, the merciless Indian Savages, whose known Rule of Warfare,
is an undistinguished Destruction of all Ages, Sexes and Condi-
tions.”160 When, during the late nineteenth century, some leaders of
the National Farmers’ Alliance, an organization of agrarian pop-
ulists, called for establishment of democracy in property ownership,
they supported the breakup of Indian Tribal land holdings and
allotment of Indian lands to white settlers for the sake of “the
common good,” an aim that Congress adopted in the Dawes Act of
156. See Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 56 (1978) (“As separate sovereigns
pre-existing the Constitution, tribes have historically been regarded as unconstrained by
those constitutional provisions framed specifically as limitations on federal or state
authority.”).
157. See, e.g., Matthew L.M. Fletcher, The Supreme Court’s Legal Culture War Against
Tribal Law, 2 INTERCULTURAL HUM.RTS. L. REV. 93, 105 (2007) (discussing the U.S. Supreme
Court’s concern that Tribalism suffers a democratic deficit in light of the “restrictive
requirements of tribal citizenship”).
158. See Riley, supra note 21.
159. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
160. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 29 (U.S. 1776).
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1887.161 And when Congress terminated federal recognition of over
one hundred Indian Tribes during the Termination Era of the 1950s
and 1960s, it pointed to the allegedly “communistic traits” of Indian
Tribes as a threat to their participation in American democracy.162
Thus, the premises of the incompatibility thesis have appeared in
federal Indian law and policy over time. In Johnson v. M’Intosh, one
of the foundational cases of federal Indian law, the Marshall Court
described Indian Tribes as “fierce savages” that could not be
assimilated and therefore were divested of ultimate title over their
lands.163 The Court’s description of Tribes as primitive and violent
is worth quoting:
[T]he tribes of Indians inhabiting this country were fierce
savages, whose occupation was war, and whose subsistence was
drawn chiefly from the forest. To leave them in possession of
their country, was to leave the country a wilderness; to govern
them as a distinct people, was impossible, because they were as
brave and as high spirited as they were fierce, and were ready
to repel by arms every attempt on their independence.164
We see here an early example of the premises of the incompatibility
thesis: Tribes are primal, violently so. Moreover, they are uncompro-
mising, fierce peoples who cannot be governed. In that way, the
thinking goes, Tribes are a threat to the national unity necessary for
the American experiment to succeed.
These same premises have reappeared in various federal policies
from Johnson up to the modern era. Writing in support of the
creation of a comprehensive reservation system, the Commissioner
of Indian Affairs opined in 1848 that Indians are “inveterately
wedded to the savage habits, customs, and prejudices in which [they
161. See Anna di Robilant, Populist Property Law, 49 CONN. L. REV. 933, 964 (2017).
162. Robert A. Williams, Jr., Small Steps on the Long Road to Self-Sufficiency for Indian
Nations: The Indian Tribal Governmental Tax Status Act of 1982, 22 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 335,
353-54 (1985); see supra note 16.
163. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 587-90 (1823); see Robert A. Williams, Jr., Columbus’s Legacy:
The Rehnquist Court’s Perpetuation of European Cultural Racism Against American Indian
Tribes, 39 FED. BAR NEWS & J. 358, 363 (1992) (“Johnson’s candid acknowledgment of the
racist assumptions supporting the Doctrine of Discovery illuminates how deeply embedded
European cultural racism is in the foundations of United States Federal Indian law.”).
164. Johnson, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 590.
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have] been reared.”165 Writing twenty years later, the Commissioner
conceded that colonialism had entailed “two hundred and fifty years
of injustice, oppression and wrong,” but nevertheless repeated the
ideas of tribal primitiveness and savagery.166 (Colonial oppression,
it seems, was not driven by primal instincts and distorted thinking,
but instead perpetrated with “cold, calculating and relentless
perseverance.”)167
The Court, for its part, repeated these themes even when ruling
for Indians. In Ex parte Crow Dog, a case that figures prominently
within the modern Court’s jurisprudence concerning the democrat-
ic deficit of Indian Tribalism, the Court held that an Indian Tribe,
not the federal government, had jurisdiction to address murder be-
tween Tribal members on the reservation.168 To permit a federal
prosecution, the Court worried, would be to extend federal law “over
aliens and strangers; over the members of a community separated
by race, by tradition, by the instincts of a free though savage life,”
thus trying Indians “according to the law of a social state ... opposed
to the traditions of their history, to the habits of their lives, to the
strongest prejudices of their savage nature; one which measures the
red man’s revenge by the maxims of the white man’s morality.”169
During the Termination Era of the 1950s and 1960s, federal
Indian policy’s version of the incompatibility thesis lumped In-
dian Tribes with the threat of communism. In 1950, President Tru-
man appointed Dillon S. Myer the Commissioner of the Bureau of
Indian Affairs.170 Myer, who had been the director of the federal
agency that implemented the internment of Japanese Americans,
“embraced the cultural melting pot and firmly opposed cultural
pluralism.”171 Federal termination policy treated Indian Tribalism
165. WILLIAM MEDDILL, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONER OF INDIAN AFFAIRS (1848),
reprinted in DOCUMENTS OF UNITED STATES INDIAN POLICY 76, 76 (Francis Paul Prucha ed.,
3d ed. 2000).
166. NATHANIEL G. TAYLOR, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONER OF INDIAN AFFAIRS
(1868), reprinted in DOCUMENTS OF UNITED STATES INDIAN POLICY, supra note 165, at 122,
125.
167. Id.
168. Ex parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556, 572 (1883).
169. Id. at 571.
170. See Casey Ryan Kelly, Orwellian Language and the Politics of Tribal Termination
(1953-1960), 74 W.J. COMMC’N 351, 357 (2010).
171. Id.
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as “divisive cultural separatism.”172 It was undemocratic to recog-
nize separate Tribal sovereignty, which fostered a form of commu-
nism.173 One terminationist “described reservations as experiments
in ‘forced communism’ that kept Indians ‘economically and socially
chained to [the] reservation.’”174 Thus, “[t]ermination garnered
support by accessing Cold War discourses emphasizing cultural ho-
mogeneity and individualism in contradistinction to Soviet com-
munism.”175 The goal of termination was to promote democracy by
ending Tribal sovereignty and fostering national unity: once Trib-
alism was terminated, the “Indian then could take pride not only
in being an Indian but in being an American.”176
In sum, federal Indian law and policy at times has reflected the
incompatibility thesis, which served to legitimate colonial rule.
b. The Democratic Deficit Claim as a Modern Example of the
Incompatibility Thesis
Today, the incompatibility thesis appears within federal Indian
law as an argument that Tribal governance suffers a “democratic
deficit.” The democratic deficit claim, in a nutshell, is that Indian
Tribal governance threatens American democracy insofar as Indian
Tribes seek to regulate individuals who have not consented to Tribal
authority.177 Nonmembers “cannot vote in tribal elections, run for
tribal office, or serve on tribal juries.”178 Thus, nonmembers are
“permanently excluded from political participation” within a
Tribe.179 This permanent exclusion violates the basic premise of
American democracy: consent of the governed.180 Without such
consent, Indian Tribes have no legitimate authority to govern
nonmembers. In this way, Indian Tribalism is incompatible with
American democracy.
172. Id.
173. See id. at 356.
174. Id. at 365.
175. Id. at 356.
176. Id. at 366.
177. See ALEINIKOFF, supra note 22, at 115.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 116.
180. See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text.
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The Supreme Court has developed this version of the incompati-
bility thesis in its opinions concerning Tribal jurisdiction over non-
members. In Duro v. Reina, the Court held, per Justice Kennedy,
that Indian Tribes lack criminal jurisdiction over nonmembers.181
Tribal governments, the Court reasoned, do not possess the “basic
attribute of full territorial sovereignty.”182 Rather, their “retained
sovereignty” is limited to “that needed to control their own internal
relations, and to preserve their own unique customs and social
order.”183 Such a “distinction between members and nonmembers
and its relation to self-governance is recognized in other areas of
Indian law,” the Court noted, ranging from “[e]xemption from state
taxation for residents of a reservation, [which] ... is determined by
tribal membership,” to Tribal regulation of nonmembers hunting
and fishing on fee land within a reservation.184 While Tribal
sovereignty may extend over nonmembers in some scenarios, the
Court reasoned that Tribal criminal jurisdiction stops at “internal
relations among members.”185 Nonmembers may not “vote, hold
office, or serve on a jury” in Tribal proceedings.186 That democratic
deficit explains the limits on Tribal authority.
The Court’s reasoning is worth quoting at length:
We hesitate to adopt a view of tribal sovereignty that would
single out another group of citizens, nonmember Indians, for
trial by political bodies that do not include them. As full citizens,
Indians share in the territorial and political sovereignty of the
United States. The retained sovereignty of the tribe is but a
recognition of certain additional authority the tribes maintain
over Indians who consent to be tribal members. Indians like all
other citizens share allegiance to the overriding sovereign, the
United States. A tribe’s additional authority comes from the
181. 495 U.S. 676, 679 (1990), superseded by statute, Act of Oct. 28, 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-
137, 105 Stat. 646, as recognized in United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 199-200 (2004).
182. Id. at 685.
183. Id. at 685-86.
184. Id. at 686-87 (first citing Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Rsrv., 447 U.S.
134, 161 (1980) (taxation); and then citing Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 565 (1981)
(hunting and fishing regulation)).
185. Id. at 688.
186. Id.
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consent of its members, and so in the criminal sphere member-
ship marks the bounds of tribal authority.187
Put differently, to the extent that Indian Tribalism is based upon
the actual consent of its members, it is consistent with the “political
sovereignty of the United States.”188 Without such consent, Indian
Tribalism suffers a democratic deficit.
This theme is repeated throughout opinions of various federal
judges within the modern era of federal Indian law. In United States
v. Lara, the Supreme Court held that Congress’s statutory response
to Duro, by which Congress recognized inherent Tribal sovereignty
over nonmember Indians,189 did not violate the Double Jeopardy
Clause of the Constitution in a case of federal and Tribal prosecu-
tions for the same offense.190 Justice Kennedy concurred in the
judgment on narrow grounds, writing separately to repeat his
concern about Indian Tribalism’s democratic deficit, suggesting it
was of constitutional significance.191 As Justice Kennedy wrote,
“[t]he Constitution is based on a theory of original, and continuing,
consent of the governed. Their consent depends on the understand-
ing that the Constitution has established the federal structure,
which grants the citizen the protection of two governments, the
Nation and the State.”192 Indian Tribalism is incompatible with this
constitutional commitment to consent of the governed. It is a
“historical exception” to the Constitution’s theory of consent,193
except, perhaps, “to the limited extent that a member of a tribe
consents to be subjected to the jurisdiction of his own tribe.”194
Justice Souter, who dissented in Lara, similarly viewed Tribal
sovereignty as an anomaly.195 Justice Souter developed his reason-
ing in a concurring opinion in Nevada v. Hicks, a case concerning
187. Id. at 693.
188. Id.
189. See 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2).
190. United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 199-200, 210 (2004).
191. Id. at 212 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
192. Id.
193. Id. (emphasis added).
194. Id.
195. Id. at 226 (Souter, J., dissenting) (“It is as true today as it was in 1886 that the
relationship of Indian tribes to the National Government is ‘an anomalous one and of a
complex character.’” (quoting United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 381 (1886))).
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the adjudicatory jurisdiction of a Tribal court in civil litigation.196
Souter reasoned that the lack of actual consent of nonmembers to
Indian Tribal governance presents a problem of “practical conse-
quence” insofar as “Tribal courts ... differ from other American
courts” and are not subject to the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth
Amendment.197 To an outsider, Tribal law “would be unusually
difficult ... to sort out”—all the more reason for the Court to be
worried about the democratic principle of consent of the governed.198
Lower federal court judges have sounded the same notes. As
Judge Kleinfeld put it in Native Village of Venetie I.R.A. Council v.
Alaska, “The weapon [of Tribal sovereignty] is dangerous to
Indians, because it deprives Indians subject to tribal governments
of the protection of the United States Constitution.”199 Federal
courts should “be chary of loose application” of this dangerous
weapon.200 More recently, in Dolgencorp, Inc. v. Mississippi Band of
Choctaw Indians, a case that ultimately resulted in an evenly
divided Supreme Court decision, Fifth Circuit Judge Jerry Smith
reasoned in a dissenting opinion that to recognize Tribal adjudica-
tory jurisdiction over a nonmember would “profoundly upset[ ] the
careful balance” between Indian Tribalism and American sover-
eignty.201 In that case, the nonmember defendant had entered into
a consensual agreement with the Tribal government.202 Even so,
Judge Smith reasoned, the nonmember defendant’s consent would
not be the basis for Tribal authority, “insofar as [the defendant] will
be forced to defend [the plaintiff’s] claims in an unfamiliar forum
without the benefit of constitutional protections.”203
This version of the incompatibility thesis may seem plausible, but
it proves too much. According to the thesis, Indian Tribalism is
incompatible with the democratic principle of consent of the gov-
erned to the extent that Tribal governments seek to regulate
196. Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 355 (2001).
197. Id. at 383, 384 (Souter, J., concurring).
198. Id. at 385.
199. 687 F. Supp. 1380, 1389 (D. Alaska 1988), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 944 F.2d 548 (9th
Cir. 1991).
200. Id.
201. 746 F.3d 167, 178 (5th Cir. 2014), aff’d, 136 S. Ct. 2159 (2016).
202. Id. at 181.
203. Id.
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nonmembers who cannot vote, hold office, or participate on juries.204
The same could be said of state governments seeking to regulate
citizens of other states. A simple example illustrates the point:
California may criminally prosecute a citizen of Nevada who
commits a crime within California even though the Nevada citizen
cannot vote in California elections, hold elected office within
California, or be selected to serve on a jury in California. The thesis
also proves too much insofar as it calls into question federal
criminal prosecutions of noncitizens who cannot vote in federal
elections, hold federal office, or serve on federal juries.
For this version of the incompatibility thesis to avoid the charge
of absurdity, it must rest on a conception of democracy that is more
substantive than electoral processes and jury service. This more
substantive conception is suggested by Justice Kennedy’s refer-
ences to federalism and individual rights in Lara.205 Within the
American system, Justice Kennedy posits, consent of the governed
is limited to the national and state governments, each of which has
a duty of protection towards Americans.206 This duty extends to
protecting individual rights.207 American democracy is thus defined
as a federal system whose authority flows from the continuing
consent of one “We the People,” who look to the national and state
governments to protect their individual rights. Indian Tribal
governance is an exception to this democratic system.
This Tribal exception threatens individual rights, or so the
argument goes. Examined closely, the premises of the incompatibil-
ity thesis within federal Indian law begin to look a lot like the
premises of the incompatibility thesis outside it. The United States
must ensure “that its citizens be protected ... from unwarranted
intrusions on their personal liberty.”208 A presumption against
Tribal court jurisdiction over nonmembers who have not consented
to Tribal authority is warranted, lest the United States fail to fulfill
this obligation.209 The unstated premise is that Indian Tribalism
204. See supra notes 184-87 and accompanying text.




208. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 210 (1978).
209. Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 384 (2001) (Souter, J., concurring).
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results in an “us-versus-them” system of governance that will be
systematically prejudiced against nonmembers of the Tribe. Tribal
law is unknowable to anyone outside the Tribe. Tribal courts, un-
constrained by the Constitution, are unlikely to be fair to non-
members.
The Court’s opinion in Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, a
decision denying Tribal criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians,
comes closest to stating this premise explicitly.210 Quoting Ex parte
Crow Dog, a nineteenth-century Supreme Court decision that
denied federal criminal jurisdiction over crimes involving Tribal
members, the Court in Oliphant reasoned in terms that should be
familiar.211 The Court suggested that to subject non-Indians to
Tribal authority would be to leave them at the mercy of “aliens and
strangers,” “a different race,” one applying “a standard made by
others and not for them.”212
These are the premises of the incompatibility thesis as applied to
federal Indian law. Tribes treat others “as some kind of alien.”213
They play zero-sum politics and are unfair to outsiders.214 Tribalism,
therefore, is incompatible with democracy.
C. The Incompatibility Thesis’s Essentialism
The incompatibility thesis rests upon essentialist premises that
do not withstand scrutiny. Take the claim that Indian Tribes view-
ed each other as hardly human.215 That claim is inconsistent with
the history of the Haudenosaunee, a confederacy of the Mohawks,
Oneidas, Onondagas, Cayugas, and the Senecas, five tribes that
“confronted the immensely difficult problems of intercultural com-
munication and accommodation during the early Encounter era.”216
210. See Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 210-11.
211. Id.
212. Id. (quoting Ex parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556, 571 (1883)); see Bethany R. Berger,
Justice and the Outsider: Jurisdiction over Nonmembers in Tribal Legal Systems, 37 ARIZ.ST.
L.J. 1047, 1063 (2005) (discussing Duro v. Reina).
213. Sullivan, supra note 8.
214. Id.
215. See supra notes 8-9 and accompanying text.
216. Robert A. Williams, Jr., Linking Arms Together: Multicultural Constitutionalism in
a North American Indigenous Vision of Law and Peace, 82 CALIF. L. REV. 981, 983, 987-88,
1001 (1994).
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It is inconsistent with Chief “Kiotseaeton’s offer to ‘link arms to-
gether’ with the French and their allied Indian tribes [at the treaty
council] at Three Rivers in 1645.”217 Along the Northern American
colonial frontier, for example, Indian Tribes often appealed to the
language of kinship and trust to describe relationships among
different peoples.218 As an Iroquois diplomat put it to the English in
Albany in 1754, “[L]et it be a Part of the present Agreement [be-
tween peoples] that We shall treat one another as Brethren to the
latest Generation.”219 This sort of diplomacy is not the diplomacy
of us-versus-them.
Now consider the claim that tribalism is authoritarian. According
to one commentator, “When a tribal leader does so, the tribe
immediately jumps on command.”220 And yet historians have shown
that during the time of contact with Indigenous Peoples, “[u]nlike
European political systems, which were hierarchical and relied on
coercive authority, Indigenous systems typically functioned on a
participatory and consensual basis. Individual members retained
considerable personal autonomy, and societal norms were usually
maintained by persuasion and social pressure rather than force.”221
Tribal democracy is common, not unprecedented. In his recent
global history of democracy, David Stasavage has argued that
“[e]arly democracy was so common in all regions of the globe that we
should see it as a naturally occurring condition in human so-
cieties.”222 Democracy did not spring forth from Athens alone.
Examples of early democracies exist across the world, including
among Indigenous Peoples. Consider, for example, the political
system of the Wyandot People of Northeastern Woodlands of North
America, whom the French called the Huron, and the system of
collective decision-making within the Republic of Tlaxcala, which
was near Tenochtitlan in what is now Mexico.223 The Wyandots’
217. Id. at 994.
218. Robert A. Williams, Jr., “The People of the States Where They Are Found Are Often
Their Deadliest Enemies”: The Indian Side of the Story of Indian Rights and Federalism, 38
ARIZ. L. REV. 981, 993 (1996).
219. Id. at 994 (quoting the Iroquois diplomat Hendrick).
220. Sullivan, supra note 8.
221. Kent McNeil, Sovereignty and Indigenous Peoples in North America, 22 U.C. DAVIS J.
INT’L L. & POL’Y 81, 92 (2016).
222. STASAVAGE, supra note 37, at 5.
223. See id. at 37-42.
2020] TRIBALISM AND DEMOCRACY 463
political system was a participatory and intertribal form of de-
mocracy, with “collective governance at three different levels”: the
village, the tribe, and the confederacy.224 French Jesuits reported
surprise at the “absence of hierarchical governance found in Huron
society when compared with their home country of France.”225
Indian Tribalism does not equal authoritarianism.
One might object that evidence of democracy within Indian Tribes
does not show that Tribes interact with other peoples in demo-
cratic ways. But Wyandot democracy, for example, was not simply
intra-Tribal, but also inter-Tribal, operating at the level of a con-
federacy.226 And, as we have already seen, this inter-Tribal de-
mocracy was not unique among Indigenous social organizations
and traditions of diplomacy.227
Commentators commit the fallacy of essentialism when they
equate Indian Tribes with autocracies. Historically, for instance,
there are examples of democracies and autocracies among Indig-
enous Peoples in the Americas.228 Today, there are many different
forms of Tribal governance within the United States. Many Tribes
today have written constitutions.229 But many do not.230 Some have
democratic systems of decision-making, including elections for
government officials.231 Others constitute their governments “based
on clan systems or employ complex (and sometimes secretive) meth-
ods for the selection of leaders that are rooted in hundreds of years
of tribal culture and religion.”232 To argue that there is a single es-
sence of Indian Tribalism is to ignore actual Tribes’ various his-
tories, laws, and forms of governance.
224. Id. at 38-39.
225. Id. at 39.
226. Id. at 38-39.
227. See supra notes 222-25 and accompanying text.
228. See STASAVAGE, supra note 37, at 37-52 (discussing examples of early democracy and
early autocracy).
229. Riley, supra note 21, at 1081-82 (“Constitutional governance is a familiar structure
in Indian country, as most tribes today operate under a written constitution.”).
230. Id. at 1082 (“Not all foundational governing principles are captured in the form of a
written constitution, however.”).
231. See, e.g., id. at 1076-77.
232. Id. at 1100.
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III. THE COMPATIBILITY THESIS: INDIAN TRIBALISM AND AMERICAN
DEMOCRACY
This Part argues that Indian Tribalism is part of the story of
American democracy. First, Indian Tribal sovereignty is compatible
with the ideal of self-government. Federal recognition of Tribal
sovereignty safeguards this ideal. Second, the ways in which Indian
Tribal governments interact with other governments is also
compatible with democracy: Indian Tribal governance involves
discourse and negotiation, not coercion and zero-sum gaming.
Finally, the persistence of Indian Tribalism is part of the history of
American democracy. In all three ways, Indian Tribalism and
American democracy are compatible.
This Part does not seek to show that the actual practices of Indian
Tribes are always consistent with the values of American democ-
racy. The picture is more complicated than that. Indian Tribal
governments that act in undemocratic or illiberal ways exist.233
Some Tribal governments have played zero-sum politics with their
own citizens or with noncitizens. That is true of other governments
too.234 Contra the incompatibility thesis (particularly as it has
surfaced in federal Indian law), these are not the only practices
worth paying attention to when thinking about “tribalism” and
democracy. That is all this Part sets out to prove.235
233. See supra notes 228-32 and accompanying text.
234. See, e.g., Andrew Reynolds, North Carolina Is No Longer Classified as a Democracy,
NEWS & OBSERVER (Dec. 31, 2016, 10:45 AM), https://www.newsobserver.com/opinion/op-ed/
article122593759.html#storylink=cpy [https://perma.cc/PN9U-9ZTH] (explaining that “[i]n the
just released [Electoral Integrity Project] report, North Carolina’s overall electoral integrity
score of 58/100 for the 2016 election places us alongside authoritarian states.”).
235. Where a particular Tribal government acts in an illiberal way, it is not clear that the
democratic solution is for the United States to impose its norms on Indian Tribes. In other
words, we should distinguish the substantive critique of a particular Indian Tribe’s illiberal
or undemocratic actions from the remedial question of how, if at all, the United States should
respond. See Kevin K. Washburn, What the Future Holds: The Changing Landscape of Federal
Indian Policy, 130 HARV. L. REV. F. 200, 200-02 (2017). Moreover, liberalism, at least on some
understandings, entails certain forms of pluralism and accommodation of divergent norm-
generating communities. See Angela R. Riley, (Tribal) Sovereignty and Illiberalism, 95 CALIF.
L. REV. 799, 800 (2007).
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A. Indian Tribalism and Self-Government
Critics of federal recognition of Indian Tribal governance argue
that Indians should rely on individual rights and votes to protect
their interests. But rights and votes are not the only ways that
Americans resolve their differences in a democratic way. American
democracy also assigns and divides powers among political commu-
nities, including, for example, states, cities, counties—and Indian
Tribes. In this way, Indian Tribalism is compatible with American
democracy.
1. Rights, Powers, and Votes
Typically, we think of democracy in terms of rights and votes.236
Voting is a way that we hold representatives to account for the
policies they support, while rights are a way of putting some policies
off the table no matter the vote. In any given election, there are
some winners and some losers, and we hope the system is set up so
that everyone will be winners sometime. Some losses, however, are
too grave for a democracy to impose on anyone, and rights are one
way we guard against those sorts of losses.237 Rights are also the
way that we police the political process for the sorts of failures that
lead to perennial losses for some groups.238
The art of American democracy, however, is made out of more
than the clay of rights and votes. It also depends upon dividing the
powers of self-government. In this sense, American democracy is
the art of federalism and localism.
We tend to think of federalism and localism in terms of separa-
tion—hence the familiar judicial refrain about dual sovereignty and
an insistence on separating what is “truly local” from what is “truly
national.”239 Increasingly, however, scholars of federalism have ar-
gued that we should think of federalism and localism in terms of
236. See Daryl J. Levinson, Rights and Votes, 121 YALE L.J. 1286, 1288 (2012).
237. See id. at 1289 (noting that rights “disallow[ ] certain outcomes that would threaten
[minority] interests”).
238. Cue Carolene Products’s Footnote Four. See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304
U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938); JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF
JUDICIAL REVIEW 135 (1980).
239. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 617-18 (2000).
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integration as well.240 This view is not intuitive, in part because
federalism and localism have been intertwined with slavery, the Jim
Crow South, and the New Jim Crow today.241 It may be that fed-
eralism’s patterns of racial segregation and subordination are so
entrenched that federalism cannot reliably serve as a safeguard of
American democracy. However, increasingly it has become plausible
to tell a different sort of story about federalism.
In Dean Heather Gerken’s telling, dividing powers is one way for
American democracy to discharge its debt to political and racial
minorities.242 Votes may not be enough when numbers are small,
even if they ensure statistical mirroring.243 And rights may not be
enough where all they assure is an individual’s ability to stand and
be ignored.244 Federalism and localism create “a world in which
political and racial minorities have a chance both to govern and to
be governed, a chance both to wield power and stand against it.”245
Whether federalism and localism can and do play that role for
racial minorities is open for debate. But what Dean Gerken argues
is true of states and cities is true of Tribal sovereigns.246 Federal
recognition of Indian Tribes’ preconstitutional rights of self-gov-
ernment helps to discharge a debt the United States owes in light
of its incorporation of Indian Tribes within the polity. And Tribal
sovereignty creates spaces for Indians to participate in American
democracy that are not secured by individual rights or votes alone.
240. See, e.g., Jessica Bulman-Pozen, From Sovereignty and Process to Administration and
Politics: The Afterlife of American Federalism, 123 YALE L.J. 1920, 1922 (2014) (“[S]tate and
federal governance and interests are deeply intertwined and, in many cases, indistinguish-
able.”); Heather K. Gerken, The Loyal Opposition, 123 YALE L.J. 1958, 1960 (2014) (arguing
that decentralization is a “means of integrating” the polity).
241. See Gerken, supra note 240, at 1967-68.
242. See id. at 1960, 1962.
243. Id. at 1961.
244. See id.
245. Id. at 1989.
246. See Maggie Blackhawk, Federal Indian Law as Paradigm Within Public Law, 132
HARV. L. REV. 1787, 1798 (2019) (“[T]he national government has best protected Native
peoples by bestowing power, not rights, through the recognition of inherent tribal
sovereignty.”).
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2. The Democratic Deficit in American Colonialism
If American democracy is government by the people, then
American colonialism suffers from a democratic deficit. Indian
Tribes are peoples who exercised the power of self-government long
before colonial contact. The United States did not seek their consent
to the Constitution.247 To the extent that Indian Tribes consented to
incorporation within the United States, it was through treaties.248
Yet the United States has asserted a plenary power to break its
treaty promises.249 The logic of plenary power is the logic of
conquest: it makes coercion the source of legal authority.
Plenary power’s logic is rooted in the doctrine of discovery. This
doctrine of colonial law held that discovery of Indigenous lands
“gave title to the government by whose subjects, or by whose
authority, it was made, against all other European governments.”250
European colonial powers agreed upon a doctrine of discovery in
order to minimize the risk they would go to war among themselves
over control of Indigenous lands.251 This bargain did not depend
upon the consent of Indigenous Peoples.
Federal recognition of Indian Tribes’ sovereignty is a necessary
response to the democratic deficit arising from colonial rule. It does
not return Indian Tribes to the position they were in prior to
American colonialism, but it does help to “ameliorate the sting”
arising from the United States’ assertion of constitutional suprem-
acy based upon coercion rather than consent.252 In this sense, then,
the United States’ ongoing recognition of Tribal self-government is
compatible with the principle of self-government that Americans
celebrated in the Declaration of Independence.
247. See Singel, supra note 36, at 837.
248. See Philip P. Frickey, Marshalling Past and Present: Colonialism, Constitutionalism,
and Interpretation in Federal Indian Law, 107 HARV. L. REV. 381, 408-17 (1993).
249. See, e.g., Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 565-66 (1903).
250. Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 573 (1823).
251. See id.
252. Cf. Abner S. Greene, Religious Freedom and (Other) Civil Liberties: Is There a Middle
Ground?, 9 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 161, 164 (2015) (“[T]o ameliorate the sting from [an]
otherwise unfounded insistence on uniform legal obedience, the state should accommodate
those who live according to norms that differ from those of the law.”).
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For Indian Tribes, the “measured separatism”253 that federal
recognition affords safeguards democracy. It allows Indian Tribes
space for self-government, including the “right ... to make their own
laws and be ruled by them.”254 It also allows Indian Tribes to
provide their own government services to their own citizens;255 to
create their own criminal courts and appoint their own judges,
juries, and prosecutors;256 and, most fundamentally, to constitute
their own governments and rules for citizenship.257
3. Indian Tribalism and the Structure of American Democracy
In light of this measured separatism, is Indian Tribalism
compatible with American democracy? A starting point to answering
this question is the U.S. Supreme Court’s recent opinion in McGirt
v. Oklahoma.258 In that case, the Court held that the Creek Nation’s
Reservation persists in Eastern Oklahoma because Congress has
never legislated otherwise.259 The Court rejected the State of
Oklahoma’s argument that recognizing the Reservation would have
devastating consequences for governance there.260 It explained that
the Creek Nation is a flourishing democracy that provides a variety
of public services.261 The Creek Nation and the State have worked
“as partners” before, negotiating intergovernmental agreements to
resolve disputes, and may do so again in response to the Court’s
253. CHARLES F. WILKINSON, AMERICAN INDIANS, TIME, AND THE LAW: NATIVE SOCIETIES
IN A MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 14 (1987).
254. Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 220 (1959).
255. See Geoffrey D. Strommer & Stephen D. Osborne, The History, Status, and Future of
Tribal Self-Governance Under the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act,
39 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 1, 21 (2015).
256. See Addie C. Rolnick, Recentering Tribal Criminal Jurisdiction, 63 UCLA L. REV.
1638, 1642 (2016) (“[T]ribes have prioritized building effective and responsive criminal justice
institutions.”).
257. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 72 n.32 (1978) (“A tribe’s right to define
its own membership for tribal purposes has long been recognized as central to its existence
as an independent political community.”).
258. 140 S. Ct. 2452 (2020).
259. Id. at 2482.
260. See id. at 2479-82.
261. Id. at 2467.
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opinion.262 This Subsection and the next will unpack these struc-
tural ways in which Indian Tribalism is compatible with democracy.
a. Participatory Democracy
Tribal sovereignty is compatible with democracy because it
secures opportunities for participation in political decision-making.
Participatory theories take democracy to mean something more
than voting in elections.263 It means popular participation, a power
to decide what shall be done, not simply who will do it. Proponents
of participatory democracy value civic engagement in its own right,
arguing that participation in self-government strengthens the polity
and enriches the lives of participants.264
City power is often celebrated for its participatory potential. Our
federal government and the states may operate at too large a scale
to allow frequent and meaningful popular participation. Not so with
our cities, which are “surely a more likely source of participatory
democracy,” so long as city governments have real power to make
decisions.265
There is a risk of projecting too much hope onto cities,266 just as
there is a risk of romanticizing Indian Tribes as sites of participa-
tory democracy. Local government may remind us of a New England
town meeting; it may also recall the “private power of the plantation
owner.”267 My argument is not that each Indian Tribe’s governance
structures are necessarily participatory for all Tribal citizens. Yet
even a casual look at governance in Indian Country reveals rich
262. Id. at 2481.
263. See, e.g., BENJAMIN R. BARBER, STRONG DEMOCRACY: PARTICIPATORY POLITICS FOR A
NEW AGE 153 (2003) (“Strong democracy is defined by politics in the participatory mode:
literally, it is self-government by citizens rather than representative government in the name
of citizens.”).
264. See, e.g., Hanna Fenichel Pitkin & Sara M. Shumer, On Participation, in DEMOCRACY:
A READER 391, 392-93 (Ricardo Blaug & John Schwarzmantel eds., 2d ed. 2016).
265. Gerald E. Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1059, 1073 (1980).
266. See, e.g., Joan Chalmers Williams, The City, The Hope of Democracy: The Casebook
as Moral Act, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1174, 1175 (1990) (book review) (“American reformers’ hopes
for the city are one aspect of what I have called the whore/madonna syndrome in local
government law: American intellectuals’ tendency to caricature cities as either the downfall
or the hope of virtue in government.”).
267. Daniel Farbman, Reconstructing Local Government, 70 VAND.L.REV. 413, 414 (2017).
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traditions of participatory democracy.268 As Professor Wenona Singel
has explained, many Indian Tribes have general councils in which
Tribal citizens may participate in deciding political questions of
common concern.269 Singel also discusses participatory democracy
at the level of Tribal constitution-making, which may include
“lengthy and detailed negotiation over adopting or amending tribal
constitutions,” with “deep engagement by the entire community in
the most basic yet fundamental issues of governance.”270 She points
to Eric Lemont’s case study of constitutional reform in four Tribal
Nations—the Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma, the Hualapai Nation,
the Navajo Nation, and the Northern Cheyenne Tribe.271 As this
case study found, leaders of constitutional reform focused resources
to enable public participation.272 Responding to problems of
participation in prior reform efforts, they presented proposals in
Native languages and “reach[ed] out to people where they live and
work,” using “intensive and personalized approaches” to engage and
educate the citizenry as part of the reform process.273 For example,
in 1998, Albert Hale, then-President of the Navajo Nation, traveled
the Nation on horseback to inform citizens about proposed
reforms.274 Thus, Siegel concludes, Tribal self-government provides
“rich opportunities for civic engagement.”275
b. Democratic Pluralism: Tribes and/as Interest Groups
Tribal governments also function as interest groups representing
their peoples in state and federal policy making. One way of
thinking about democracy emphasizes the pluralism of interest
groups and the role of representatives. Democratic pluralism focuses
upon elections as a means for voters to exercise limited control over
268. See Singel, supra note 36, at 834.
269. Id.
270. Id.
271. See id. at 834 n.348 (citing Eric Lemont, Developing Effective Processes of American
Indian Constitutional and Governmental Reform: Lessons from the Cherokee Nation of
Oklahoma, Hualapai Nation, Navajo Nation, and Northern Cheyenne Tribe, 26 AM. INDIAN
L. REV. 147 (2002)).
272. Lemont, supra note 271, at 150.
273. Id.
274. Id. at 170.
275. Singel, supra note 36, at 835.
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their representatives and on interest group lobbying.276 Healthy
democracies are ones in which multiple interest groups push, pull,
and tug over policies, using elections, lobbying, and other levers
within government.
Much like states,277 Indian Tribes may appear as interest groups
in political and administrative processes. Created in 1944 by fifty
Tribal Nations, the National Congress of American Indians (NCAI)
is an organization of Indian Tribes that lobbies in Washington, D.C.,
on behalf of over 250 Tribes.278 Along with Tribes and other
intertribal organizations, such as the National Tribal Chairmen’s
Association, the NCAI has had significant success in the modern era
of Tribal self-determination (from the late 1960s until today)
lobbying for and against proposed legislation and administrative
action.279 Indian Tribes have also formed regional and state-level
intertribal organizations, such as the California Association of
Tribal Governments and the California Tribal Business Alliance.280
Indian Tribes and their organizational representatives lobby
extensively at the federal level.281 Their efforts may support and
amplify individual Indian voices in the federal legislative process.282
During debate about the 2013 reauthorization of the Violence
Against Women Act, for example, a delegation of American Indian
women lobbied congressional offices by sharing their stories of sur-
vival, leading to the enactment of statutory provisions partially
lifting judge-made restrictions on Tribal criminal prosecutions of
non-Indian perpetrators of violence against women.283 Joined by
a number of Tribal leaders, these Indian women advocated for
276. See, e.g., David Alan Sklansky, Police and Democracy, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1699, 1715-
16 (2005).
277. Miriam Seifter, States as Interest Groups in the Administrative Process, 100 VA. L.
REV. 953, 955-56 (2014).
278. Robert Odawi Porter, Tribal Disobedience, 11 TEX. J. ON C.L. & C.R. 137, 143 (2006).
279. See, e.g., Navajo Nation v. Dalley, No. 15-cv-00799, 2016 WL 9819590, at *3 (D.N.M.
Aug. 3, 2016) (discussing lobbying around enactment of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act).
280. See, e.g., Tribal Organizations, NAT’L CONG. OF AM. INDIANS, http://www.ncai.org/
tribal-directory/tribal-organizations [https://perma.cc/ZV6A-K9CB] (listing tribal
organizations).
281. See Porter, supra note 278, at 142-44.
282. Id.
283. See Kristen Matoy Carlson, Lobbying as a Strategy for Tribal Resilience, 2018 BYU
L. REV. 1159, 1187-88, 1192, 1194.
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recognition of Tribal sovereignty as a solution to a problem created
in no small part by federal judicial decisions.284
Such lobbying efforts are not limited to the federal government.
Indian Tribes may lobby state governments on matters ranging
from tax policy to child welfare and adoption. Tribes, for example,
lobbied successfully for enactment of the Indian Child Welfare Act
at the federal level and then for state-level Indian child welfare
acts.285 The black letter law states that Indian affairs are a matter
for the federal government to decide. The reality is that Indian
Tribes, using the many levers of American democracy, have myriad
relationships with state governments. These relationships are part
of American democracy, as McGirt underscores.
The government-to-government relationship between Indian
Tribes and the United States yields shared interests, in other words,
not just separation. Over time, these shared interests have become
reflected in litigation and judicial doctrine. Consider, for example,
the unique doctrines of preemption in federal Indian law. In New
Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, the Mescalero Apache Tribe
worked with the federal government to create a comprehensive fish
and game management program and a hunting resort on the Tribe’s
lands.286 When the State of New Mexico sought to regulate non-
Indian hunters on the Tribe’s lands, the Supreme Court held that
“federal and tribal interests reflected in federal law” together
preempted the state’s regulation.287
Indian Tribes’ sovereignty also creates opportunities for Indians
to ally with other interest groups in calling for changes to govern-
ment policy. For example, federal environmental law may impose
284. Sari Horwitz, New Law Offers Protection to Abused Native American Women, WASH.
POST (Feb. 8, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/new-law-offers-
a-sliver-of-protection-to-abused-native-american-women/2014/02/08/0466d1ae-8f73-11e3-84e1-
27626c5ef5fb_story.html [https://perma.cc/9BUB-KECJ] (“Last year, [Diane] Millich and other
American Indian women came to Washington to tell their stories to congressional leaders.
They joined tribal leaders in lobbying for the passage of the 288-page reauthorization of the
Violence Against Women Act.”).
285. See, e.g., Steven Paul McSloy, The “Miner’s Canary”: A Bird’s Eye View of American
Indian Law and Its Future, 37 NEW ENG. L. REV. 733, 737 (2003); Sandra C. Ruffin,
Postmodernism, Spirit Healing, and the Proposed Amendments to the Indian Child Welfare
Act, 30 MCGEORGE L. REV. 1221, 1261 (1999).
286. 462 U.S. 324, 327-28 (1983).
287. Id. at 334-36.
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unique obligations on federal agencies to consult with or “seek the
concurrence” of Indian Tribes in federal decisions.288 This is one
reason why, though the relationships can be fraught, Indian Tribes
have partnered with environmental organizations on matters of
common concern.289 On a pluralist conception, such partnerships
are evidence of a healthy democratic process, one in which Indian
Tribes may play a role.
c. Tribes and National Democratic Deliberations
On another conception, however, the role of Tribal governments
in national (or state) policy making may seem a problem for
democracy. Deliberative democracy, a theory of democratic legiti-
macy, focuses upon the process of democratic decision-making.290
The idea is that decision-making is legitimate if it results from a
process in which all interested parties deliberate, presenting
proposals and discussing them on an equal footing.291 In deliber-
ating, citizens should “defend proposals with considerations that
others, who are themselves free and equal, can acknowledge as
reasons.”292
Some deliberative democrats question whether identity politics
and popular social movements are compatible with collective de-
liberation of this sort.293 And some defenders of the incompatibility
288. See, e.g., 36 C.F.R. § 800.5(c)(2)(ii) (2004).
289. See, e.g., Tribal Partnerships, NAT’L WILDLIFE FED’N, https://www.nwf.org/Our-Work/
Our-Lands/Tribal-Lands [https://perma.cc/X7C9-JCCY].
290. AMY GUTMANN & DENNIS THOMPSON, WHY DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY? 3 (2004).
291. See, e.g., id.; Joshua Cohen, Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy, in DELIBERATIVE
DEMOCRACY:ESSAYS ON REASON AND POLITICS 67, 72-73 (James Bohman & William Rehg eds.,
1997); JÜRGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS: CONTRIBUTIONS TO A DISCOURSE
THEORY OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY 287-88 (William Rehg trans., MIT Press 1996) (1992). Some
versions of the theory emphasize deliberation among political and legal elites, while others
look to popular deliberation for democratic legitimacy. See, e.g., GUTMANN &THOMPSON, supra
note 290, at 8; ETHAN J. LEIB, DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA: A PROPOSAL FOR A
POPULAR BRANCH OF GOVERNMENT 31 (2004). Still others seek to bridge the two. See, e.g.,
HABERMAS, supra, at 351 (arguing for a system of collective decision-making “shaped by
deliberative politics, that is, shaped by the publicly organized contest of opinions between
experts and counterexperts and monitored by public opinion”).
292. Joshua Cohen & Charles Sabel, Directly-Deliberative Polyarchy, 3 EUR. L.J. 313, 327
(1997).
293. William H. Simon, Three Limitations of Deliberative Democracy: Identity Politics, Bad
Faith, and Indeterminacy, in DELIBERATIVE POLITICS: ESSAYS ON DEMOCRACY AND
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thesis treat identity politics as one form of “tribalism.”294 They might
argue, therefore, that Indian Tribalism is incompatible with de-
liberative democracy.
The actual practices of Indian Tribes suggest two responses. The
first focuses upon one of the claims at the core of modern Indigenous
rights: the right to consultation.295 The United Nations Declaration
on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples codifies the right to free, prior,
and informed consent concerning government actions that will af-
fect Indigenous Peoples.296 At its heart, the right to consultation is
concerned with the deliberative process by which collective decisions
are made. The following definition of consultation from the U.S.
government helps prove the point:
Consultation [between the United States and Indian Tribes]
means the process of seeking, discussing, and considering the
views of others, and, where feasible, seeking agreement with
them on how historic properties should be identified, considered,
and managed. Consultation is built upon the exchange of ideas,
not simply providing information.297
The NCAI’s best practices for consultation include principles such
as discussion on an “equal-footing basis” and “[s]how[ing] respect,
and listen[ing].”298 As Robert Miller has shown, within the United
States the right to consultation has a long history stretching back
to the precolonial period and Indigenous traditions of diplomacy:
collective deliberation in the form of “[n]egotiating, entering
agreements, and engaging in diplomacy with other governments
DISAGREEMENT 49, 51-52 (Stephen Macedo ed., 1999).
294. GOLDBERG, supra note 6, at 61 (“Manufactured tribalism is the very essence of identity
politics.”).
295. See Laura M. Seelau & Ryan Seelau, When I Want Your Opinion, I’ll Give It to You:
How Governments Support the Indigenous Right to Consultation in Theory but Not in Practice,
23 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 547, 549 (2015).
296. See, e.g., Kristen A. Carpenter & Angela R. Riley, Indigenous Peoples and the
Jurisgenerative Moment in Human Rights, 102 CALIF. L. REV. 173, 191-92 (2014); Robert J.
Miller, Consultation or Consent: The United States’ Duty to Confer with American Indian
Governments, 91 N.D. L. REV. 37, 67-87 (2015).
297. The Secretary of the Interior’s Standards and Guidelines for Federal Agency Historic
Preservation Programs Pursuant to the National Historic Preservation Act, 63 Fed. Reg.
20,496, 20,504 (Apr. 24, 1998).
298. Miller, supra note 296, at 62-63 (discussing the NCAI’S PROPOSED MINIMUM RE-
QUIREMENTS OF A VALID CONSULTATION PRIOR TO TAKING FEDERAL ACTION).
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was a regular practice of American Indian nations.”299 When Indian
Tribes seek consultation with the United States today, they draw
upon these deliberative traditions.
These practices of consultation are compatible with deliberative
democracy. The right to consultation is one way to fulfill a “principle
of deliberative inclusion.”300 For much of U.S. history, Indian Tribes
were not included in the decision-making processes that affected
them. If the “essence of democratic legitimacy should be sought ...
in the ability of all individuals subject to a collective decision to
engage in authentic deliberation about that decision,”301 then
consultation between Indian Tribes and the United States is one
way to ensure the legitimacy of American democracy.
The second response to a deliberative democratic criticism of
Indian Tribalism is that Indigenous social movements that advocate
for Tribal sovereignty are important in bringing issues forward for
national deliberation. Some, though not all, “proponents of the
deliberative model ... recognize the role of social movements in
bringing latent problems to the attention of politics.”302 By “inter-
vening in public discourse and restructuring the surrounding so-
cial relations,” social movements help ensure the inclusion neces-
sary for legitimate democratic deliberation.303
In many cases, including contests about environmental policy,
Indian Tribes’ interests catalyze social movements and bring those
interests into national democratic deliberations. Consider, for
example, the recent controversy about construction of oil pipelines,
including the Dakota Access Pipeline (DAPL) through the territory
of the Standing Rock Sioux Tribe,304 or the controversy arising
from the Trump Administration’s decision to reduce the size of the
Bears Ears National Monument.305 Indian Tribes have been at the
299. Id. at 43.
300. Joshua Cohen, Procedure and Substance in Deliberative Democracy, in DELIBERATIVE
DEMOCRACY: ESSAYS ON REASON AND POLITICS, supra note 291, at 407, 419.
301. JOHN S. DRYZEK, DEMOCRACY AND BEYOND: LIBERALS, CRITICS, CONTESTATIONS, at v
(2000) (emphasis added).
302. John Medearis, Social Movements and Deliberative Democratic Theory, 35 BRIT. J.
POL. SCI. 53, 53 (2005).
303. Id. at 55.
304. Lauren P. Phillips, Note, Killing the Black Snake: The Dakota Access Pipeline’s Fate
Post-Sierra Club v. FERC, 30 GEO. ENV’T L. REV. 731, 733-34 (2018).
305. See Charles Wilkinson, “At Bears Ears We Can Hear the Voices of Our Ancestors in
476 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62:431
forefront of national debate and deliberation about these federal
government actions.
Indian Tribes’ involvement in these debates is necessary to
legitimate democratic deliberation. The Standing Rock Sioux Tribe
objected to the construction of the DAPL, which had been rerouted
from near Bismarck, North Dakota, to the Tribe’s aboriginal
lands.306 The Obama Administration’s Army Corps of Engineers had
issued some of the necessary approvals to DAPL and reversed
course after the Tribe and its allies demanded additional delibera-
tion.307 The Trump Administration in turn reversed the Obama Ad-
ministration’s commitment to further deliberation, and the Tribe
continued its battle in the federal courts.308
The protests at Standing Rock became, in David Treuer’s
memorable phrase, “[an] Indian [p]rotest for [e]veryone.”309 The
water protectors argued that the “pipeline threatens not just tribal
land and resources but American land and resources.”310 Theirs was
a fight for an “energy democracy” based upon public deliberation at
the same time it was a fight for recognition of the Tribes’ sover-
eignty.311
* * * 
In short, Indian Tribalism provides opportunities for Tribal
citizens to participate in self-governance, not only through Tribal
policy making, but also through engagement with states and the
federal government. In this way, it is compatible with democracy.
Every Canyon and on Every Mesa Top”: The Creation of the First Native National Monument,
50 ARIZ. STATE L.J. 317, 320 (2018).
306. See generally Walter H. Mengden IV, Indigenous People, Human Rights, and
Consultation: The Dakota Access Pipeline, 41 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 441, 442 (2017).
307. See Phillips, supra note 304, at 737.
308. Id. at 738-39.




311. See Shelley Welton, Grasping for Energy Democracy, 116 MICH. L. REV. 581, 585
(2018) (defining “energy democracy” to include not only consumer choice and local energy
production but also open processes of public deliberation).
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B. Democratic Practices of Negotiation and Compromise in Indian
Country
Proponents of the incompatibility thesis might object, however,
that Indian Tribalism creates us-versus-them dynamics that distort
the democratic processes described in the previous Section. They
might argue that Indian Tribalism may be democratic internally
but antidemocratic externally. Indian Tribalism may mean “get
what you want from strangers”; it may, in other words, involve
“zero-sum” battles between groups.312
This Section addresses that objection. It argues that Indian
Tribalism involves a form of negotiated federalism that is compati-
ble with American democracy.
1. Negotiated Federalism
Some accounts conceive of democracy as a process for negotiating
differences in a divided world.313 Democratically acceptable pro-
cesses for negotiating differences entail commitments to inclusion,
political equality, and mutual respect. This view does not deny “that
workable democratic politics requires of citizens some sense of be-
ing together with one another in order to sustain the commitment
that seeking solutions to conflict under circumstances of difference
and inequality requires.”314 What is not required, however, is the
(always unattainable) national unity imagined by the incompatibil-
ity thesis. Indeed, “[i]t is far too strong ... to claim that [the neces-
sary] sense of being together requires mutual identification.”315 It
does require “agreed-upon and publicly acknowledged procedures”
for resolving problems among communities.316
Federalism is one way to structure this type of problem-solving.
As political theorist Iris Marion Young envisioned it, federalism is
a process of interaction among communities who “ought to negotiate
the terms and effects of [their] relationship.”317 These negotiations,
312. GOLDBERG, supra note 6, at 11.




317. Id. at 259.
478 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62:431
she argued, become easier when all peoples “have a right to their
own governance institutions” and are thus “free from domination.”318
Similarly, Professor Cristina Rodríguez has argued that the value
of federalism “is its creation of a framework for ongoing negotiation
of differences large and small.”319 Thus understood, the division of
governing powers among communities at the state level “consti-
tutes a framework for national integration,” not disintegration.320
Negotiation among states, and between states and the federal
government, is the engine of this national integration.321 For any
particular debate, there are, to be sure, winners and losers, “[b]ut
the inter-governmental relationships and overlapping political
communities the system creates are neither locked in zero-sum
competition nor bound by fixed rules of engagement.”322
Negotiated governance theory is one way to understand the role
that federalism plays within American democracy. This theory em-
phasizes the limited role that constitutional federalism plays in
setting the metes and bounds of governance in light of the ambigu-
ities in the Court’s federalism doctrine.323 Thus, negotiated gover-
nance theory sees federalism not as a zero-sum game, but instead
as a process of intergovernmental bargaining. Erin Ryan has ar-
gued that “intergovernmental bargaining offer[s] a means of un-
derstanding the relationship between state and federal power that
differs from the stylized model of zero-sum federalism dominating
political discourse.”324 Bargaining between the states and the feder-
al governments can be an alternative to a winner-takes-all battle
within the federal courts, as long as constitutional law allows
enough to be up for grabs in constitutional negotiations. As Ryan
described, “[r]econceptualizing the relationship between state and
federal power as one heavily mediated by negotiation demonstrates
how federalism practice departs from the rhetoric, and offers hope
318. Id.
319. Cristina M. Rodríguez, Negotiating Conflict Through Federalism: Institutional and
Popular Perspectives, 123 YALE L.J. 2094, 2094, 2097 (2014); cf. Gerken, supra note 240, at
1962 (“[F]ederalism can serve as a robust, distinctively American strategy for
institutionalizing opposition and ensuring our democracy thrives.”).
320. Rodríguez, supra note 319, at 2097.
321. See id.
322. Id. at 2098.
323. See Erin Ryan, Negotiating Federalism, 52 B.C. L. REV. 1, 21-22 (2011).
324. Id. at 4.
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for moving beyond the paralyzing features of the zero-sum dis-
course.”325
Examples of negotiated federalism abound. They include intergov-
ernmental negotiations involving states as interest groups within
the federal political process as well as negotiations between state
and federal bureaucrats throughout the administrative process.326
Other examples are less formal and apparent, but nonetheless
important: state and federal actors may, for example, “influence one
another’s outcomes through indirect iterative exchange” over
time.327 Topics for negotiation include the allocation of decision-
making authority as well as the content of substantive law.328 Under
“clouds of doctrinal and rhetorical uncertainty” about the constitu-
tional doctrines of federalism, such bargaining is both inevitable
and desirable.329
2. Negotiations in Indian Country
If negotiation is a desirable feature of our federalism, then there
is a strong case that Indian Tribalism is compatible with American
democracy. Indian Tribes have been practicing intercultural
negotiation since before the adoption of the U.S. Constitution.330
Their traditions of treaty-making are based upon mutual recogni-
tion and respect among peoples.331 These traditions are a constitu-
tive feature of contemporary Indian Tribalism.332
One reason such negotiations are central to governance in Indian
Country is that the existing doctrinal landscape concerning Tribal
jurisdiction is opaque at best. The Montana line of cases,333 for
example, has led to a complex overlay of federal common law
restrictions on the exercise of Tribal civil jurisdiction.334 The
resulting “jurisdictional uncertainty” has led Indian Tribes to
325. Id. at 4-5.
326. See id. at 5-7.
327. Id. at 69.
328. Id. at 24.
329. Id. at 136.
330. Davis, supra note 138, at 1463.
331. See, e.g., id. at 1465.
332. Id. at 1464-65.
333. See generally Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981).
334. See Davis, supra note 138, at 1474.
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negotiate with other governments and private parties concerning
their jurisdiction.335 For example, an Indian Tribe may negotiate an
agreement with a county government concerning jurisdiction or
taxation authority,336 or bargain over forum selection with a cor-
poration doing business with the Tribe.337
The U.S. Constitution makes clear that negotiations were the
means by which the United States would treat with Tribes.338 Indian
treaties provide the constitutional underpinnings of federal rec-
ognition of Indian Tribalism and help set the metes and bounds of
Indian Country.339 Treaties play a central role in Indian Country
governance because Indian Tribes “never consented to” U.S. au-
thority except through treaties.340 Their lack of consent to the
constitutional supremacy of the U.S. government frames a “compel-
ling case” for recognition of their right to govern.341 Unsurprisingly,
therefore, Indian social movements point to Indian treaties to
imagine what a democratic relationship between Indian Tribes and
the United States would look like.342
Indian Tribes did not choose to stop making treaties with the
United States. Rather, the U.S. House of Representatives halted the
practice with a rider to an appropriations bill that forced the end of
treaty-making in 1871.343 Even so, however, “constitutional negotia-
tions”344 between Indian Tribes and the United States did not end
in 1871. Today, negotiations memorialized in statutes or executive
335. See id. at 1473-74.
336. See Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Retiring the “Deadliest Enemies” Model of Tribal-State
Relations, 43 TULSA L. REV. 73, 78, 81 (2007).
337. See, e.g., Dolgencorp, Inc. v. Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians, 746 F.3d 167, 169 (5th
Cir. 2014), aff’d by an equally divided court, Dollar Gen. Corp. v. Miss. Band of Choctaw
Indians, 136 S. Ct. 2159 (2016).
338. See DELORIA & WILKINS, supra note 141, at 151.
339. See Davis, supra note 138, at 1468.
340. Robert A. Williams, Jr., Sovereignty, Racism, Human Rights: Indian Self-
Determination and the Postmodern World Legal System, 2 REV. CONST. STUD. 146, 148-49
(1995).
341. Id.
342. See VINE DELORIA, JR., BEHIND THE TRAIL OF BROKEN TREATIES: AN INDIAN
DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE 251 (1985).
343. Mark G. Hirsch, 1871: The End of Indian Treaty-Making, AM. INDIAN MAG. (2014),
https://www.americanindianmagazine.org/story/1871-end-indian-treaty-making [https://
perma.cc/2NXG-ZUGN].
344. Davis, supra note 138, at 1471.
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orders have become “treaty substitutes.”345 Under Congress’s Tribal
Self-Determination policy, the United States and Indian Tribes
negotiate self-determination contracts to support the development
of Tribal institutions and the provision of government services to
Tribal citizens.346 And, as we have seen, Indian Tribes continue to
call upon the United States to consult and negotiate about matters
affecting them.347
Indian Tribes have been remarkably successful in exercising self-
determination through these sorts of intergovernmental and in-
tercultural negotiations. As Matthew Fletcher has argued, such
negotiations help to avoid zero-sum battles between Indian Tribes
and states348—much like the federalism negotiations that provide
an alternative to zero-sum battles between the United States and
the states.349
Indian water rights negotiations provide a ready example. As
Robert Anderson has explained, water rights settlements may
“achieve various goals [for all parties] that could not otherwise be
achieved within the confines of ... adjudication.”350 The success of
these negotiations depends in part upon the “strong legal founda-
tion” that Indian water rights enjoy under the federal reserved
rights doctrine, which affords Indian Tribes senior water rights that
may trump water rights recognized under state law.351 In the
American West, the scarcity of water threatens to make water
disputes a zero-sum game. Indian Tribes have, however, looked to
negotiation as an alternative to “settling natural resource disputes
[through] ‘all or nothing’ litigation.”352 The resulting negotiations
345. WILKINSON, supra note 253, at 64.
346. See Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-
638, 88 Stat. 2203, 2206 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 5301-5423).
347. See, e.g., Sierra Crane-Murdoch, Standing Rock: A New Moment for Native-American
Rights, NEW YORKER (Oct. 12, 2016), https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/standing-
rock-a-new-moment-for-native-american-rights [https://perma.cc/LG7H-ABCC].
348. Fletcher, supra note 336, at 74.
349. See supra notes 322-28 and accompanying text.
350. See, e.g., Robert T. Anderson, Indian Water Rights: Litigation and Settlements, 42
TULSA L. REV. 23, 32 (2006) (discussing the successful Snake River settlement).
351. Robert T. Anderson, Indian Water Rights, Practical Reasoning, and Negotiated
Settlements, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1133, 1134, 1139 (2010).
352. Id. at 1134.
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have been mostly successful and have avoided winner-take-all
rulings in state courts.353
The point, in short, is that Indian Tribalism may be compatible
with American democracy in the same way that federalism is
compatible with it. Both provide a “framework for ongoing negotia-
tion on differences large and small.”354
C. Tribalism, Democracy, and Historical Memory
There is a third way in which Indian Tribalism is compatible with
American democracy. It concerns the country’s historical memory.
The United States has a settler colonial history, one that stretches
back to the Founders’ adoption of the doctrine of discovery.355 Indian
Tribes’ persistence in exercising their separate sovereignty forces
American democracy to confront its past and unsettles its easy
myths. This, too, can be compatible with democracy. Indeed, this
sort of historical memory is necessary to hold American democracy
to its ideals.356
The United States has sometimes practiced conquest while
preaching consent. As Chua has put it, America “needs to be held to
its own standards or fall under the weight of hypocrisy.”357 To be
sure, “[m]any Americans want to celebrate the country’s history and
greatness without having to dredge up its racist past every single
353. Id. at 1159. Not all intergovernmental negotiations involving Indian Tribes are
successful. The history of negotiations under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA) has
sometimes involved zero-sum gaming. Under IGRA, Indian Tribes must negotiate with states
in order to conduct some forms of on-reservation gambling. See Rebecca Tsosie, Negotiating
Economic Survival: The Consent Principle and Tribal-State Compacts Under the Indian
Gaming Regulatory Act, 29 ARIZ. STATE L.J. 25, 49-50 (1997). Thus, IGRA reversed the base-
line in federal Indian law, which holds that states do not have authority to regulate in Indian
Country. IGRA “has empowered states to assert their interests where they would otherwise
be unable to do so.” Id. at 94. The lesson of comparing water rights negotiations with IGRA
negotiations is that when “states seek ... to treat an Indian Nation’s right to govern as up for
grabs,” zero-sum battles may result. Davis, supra note 138, at 1478.
354. Rodríguez, supra note 319, at 2094.
355. See supra notes 250-51 and accompanying text.
356. See CHUA, supra note 2, at 207; cf. Annette Gordon-Reed, America’s Original Sin:
Slavery and the Legacy of White Supremacy, 97 FOREIGN AFFS. 2, 7 (2018) (“Americans must
come to grips with [the history of slavery and white supremacy] if they are to make their
country live up to its founding creed.”).
357. CHUA, supra note 2, at 207.
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time.”358 They want Thanksgiving without the Trail of Tears. To
center both within the American story would be to threaten the
national unity necessary for American democracy to thrive.359
Within the literature on tribalism and democracy, there is palpable
anxiety that constituting such national unity is a never-ending
struggle against ourselves.360
This myth of democratic unity has a long history within political
thought. Tocqueville saw it as central to the success of American
democracy, writing that “[w]hat maintains a large number of
citizens under the same government is much less the reasoned will
to remain united than the instinctive and in a way involuntary
accord that results from similarity of sentiments and resemblance
of opinions.”361 In his view, Americans shared a singular viewpoint
about religion, and this unity bound them together as one people.362
Tocqueville contrasted American unity with the “small tribes” of
American Indians, who had “wandered in the shade of the forest or
across the prairie lands.”363 Democracy required the end of nomad-
ism; it required “man ... united with his fellows.”364 Thus, Tocque-
ville looked to tropes about tribalism as a foil against which to
define the national unity necessary for democratic governance.365
Tocqueville’s vision of a singular American people was mythical
then and is so when uttered today. Religion did not unite all
Americans even when Tocqueville wrote. It is unclear when,
358. Id. at 195.
359. See, e.g., Sullivan, supra note 8.
360. GOLDBERG, supra note 6, at 11 (arguing that “the United States of America is the fruit
of the Miracle” of democracy and capitalism and lamenting that “both are unnatural”); see also
id. at 15 (“Because every generation enters this world with its natural wiring intact, every
generation must be convinced anew that the world they have been blessed to be born into is
the best one.”).
361. TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 51, at 598.
362. See id. at 599 (“Although the Anglo-Americans have several religions, they all have
the same way of envisaging religion.”).
363. Id. at 39; cf. MARK LILLA, THE ONCE AND FUTURE LIBERAL: AFTER IDENTITY POLITICS
62-63 (2017) (“[T]he principles the country was founded on gave Christians reasons to identify
with the state because the state guaranteed their right to identify with their churches.... And
so, in a sense, to become an American you had to identify only with one thing: the American
system of religious liberty.”).
364. TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 51, at 457.
365. William E. Connolly, The Liberal Image of the Nation, in POLITICAL THEORY AND THE
RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES 183, 185 (Duncan Ivison et al. eds., 2000).
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precisely, the American “super-group”366 came into being. As
William Connolly has put the criticism, “[t]he nation is experienced
by many as an imperative that must be achieved ... if democratic
governance is to be possible.... But the nation is also an imagination
of unity or wholeness that has never been actualised.”367 And as
Rebecca Tsosie has argued, democracy does not require a national
unity, but instead may entail “a multicultural federation of diverse
groups engaged in relations of mutuality and reciprocity.”368 Indian
Tribalism is part of the history of such relations in America.
Historical memory requires “acknowledg[ing] multiple and often
conflicting pasts, and the intrinsically power-infused and tension-
ridden nature of communal mythological construction.”369 The point
is not simply that those who forget history are doomed to repeat it.
It is also that democratic citizens have a responsibility to acknowl-
edge the limits of their own myths and to recognize “conflicting
histories.”370
In this understanding, Indian Tribes’ refusal to accede to
American constitutional supremacy, their refusal to go along with
popular histories that relegate Indians to historical footnotes, and
366. CHUA, supra note 2, at 21-22. Chua defines a super-group as “one in which
membership is open to individuals from all different backgrounds—ethnic, religious, racial,
cultural.” Id. at 12. If membership means formal citizenship, then this definition does not
entail a transcendent national unity so much as a certain set of immigration and
naturalization laws. But Chua’s account of America’s super-group suggests a more robust
definition of membership. She writes that “America was able to elect Barack Obama as
president because this country is a super-group,” meaning not only that it is “a group in which
membership is open to individuals of any background” but also one that “binds its members
together with a strong, overarching, group-transcending collective identity.” Id. at 22. She
argues that America became a super-group in the twentieth century, “especially after the Civil
Rights Act of 1964.” Id. at 27. During the 1960s, “women, blacks, and other minorities made
impressive inroads in American business, politics, and culture,” while changes to immigration
policy contributed to “demographic shifts.” Id. at 29-30. In other words, America became a
super-group in the second half of the twentieth century as a result of civil rights laws,
diversification of the American elite, and demographic shifts. Yet, according to Chua, it is this
very reorganization of society that has led “many white Americans” to “experience their world
as being swallowed up.” Id. at 31. If that is correct, then it suggests that all Americans do not
in fact share the “strong, overarching, group-transcending collective identity” necessary for
super-group status. Id. at 22.
367. Connolly, supra note 365, at 184.
368. Tsosie, supra note 86, at 372.
369. Duncan Bell, Agonistic Democracy and the Politics of Memory, 15 CONSTELLATIONS
148, 149 (2008).
370. See id. at 160.
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their persistent practices of self-government are democratic
practices.
Indian Tribalism is part of the story of American democracy.
Democracy is not a “specifically Western value,”371 as we have
already seen. American society—and American democracy—is a
“product” of interactions among peoples, including Indigenous
Peoples.372 Historically, that was true of the treaty period in which
“Indian peoples had complex negotiated and federated interactions”
with Indians and non-Indians.373 It is true today as Indian Tribes
continue to govern themselves. The Supreme Court recognized this
reality in McGirt: the Creek Nation is a thriving democracy that
has “proven [it] can work successfully” with the State of Oklahoma
in a “spirit of good faith, ‘comity and cooperative sovereignty.’”374
That spirit is precisely what commentators on “political tribalism”
hope for democracy.
Indian Tribes are part of the story of American democracy in a
second sense. If “[n]o country can be great if it can’t be honest,”375
then America should be honest that its history includes colonial-
ism.376 As Aziz Rana has argued, there are “two faces of American
freedom.”377 Typically, the story of American democracy focuses up-
on self-government among non-Indigenous settlers.378 Similar to
other settler states, however, America’s democracy has engaged in
“projects of ethnic and political cleansing.”379 By persisting as self-
governing peoples, Indian Tribes have pursued the ideal of democ-
racy against projects of assimilation and termination. In this side of
the story of American democracy, there is the possibility of an “al-
ternative identity for the country.”380 Perhaps the example of
371. Iris Marion Young, Hybrid Democracy: Iroquois Federalism and the Postcolonial
Project, in POLITICAL THEORY AND THE RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES, supra note 365, at
237, 245.
372. Id.
373. Id.; see supra Parts III.A.3, III.B.2 (discussing Indigenous practices of diplomacy and
treaty-making).
374. McGirt v. Oklahoma, 140 S. Ct. 2452, 2481 (2020).
375. CHUA, supra note 2, at 207.
376. See supra note 22 and accompanying text (discussing the “democratic deficit” in the
incorporation of Indian Tribes within the United States).
377. AZIZ RANA, THE TWO FACES OF AMERICAN FREEDOM (2010).
378. Id. at 10.
379. Id.
380. Id. at 14.
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American Indian Tribes suggests that what we have always been,
and what we need to learn how to be, is a democracy of “We the
Peoples,” not just “We the People.”381
CONCLUSION
There is an art to democracy. But it is not the art of the deal. The
art of democracy is more lasting than a one-off, winner-takes-all
bargain. More lasting, and harder to achieve.
Harder to achieve, some would say, because of faults that lie in
ourselves. Chief among these human flaws is a tendency toward
“tribalism.” Liberal democracies have begun to lurch from one crisis
to the next because their citizens have retreated to “tribal” camps
bent on war with one another, or so many commentators claim.
This Article set out to complicate the idea that tribalism is
incompatible with democracy. Looking at the actual histories and
practices of Indian Tribes calls the premises of the incompatibility
thesis into question. Abstract conceptions of “tribalism” are not
helpful in diagnosing what ails democracy. Much more useful is
analysis that “look[s] at the precise institutional, legal, and
constitutional mechanisms through which [democratic] decline
occurs.”382 That is the sort of microanalysis that this Article has
begun to sketch with respect to “tribalism.”
The question this Article has tried to provoke is whether Indian
Tribalism may provide lessons for working through the political
tribalism that has beset American politics. Perhaps a “realistic
appraisal of tribalism” would suggest tribal solutions to problems
democracies face.383 Perhaps, in other words, a little more tribalism
is just what democracy needs.
381. Davis, supra note 151, at 1761.
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